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Abstract
In this dissertation, we study network design problems that involve multiple — usually two —
rational decision makers. Within this class of problems, we are particularly interested in hierarchical
structures, in which decision makers (DMs) make their optimal decisions by anticipating other
DMs’ optimal responses. We present a novel method for solving the problem of the leader to near
optimality. It relies on heuristically reformulating the follower’s problem and embedding it into the
leader’s problem as constraints. The resulting formulations are more tractable and provide near-
optimal suggestions for the leader’s decision.
First, we consider a competitive facility location problem where two firms engage in a leader–
follower game. Both firms would like to maximize the customer demand that they capture. Given
the other player’s decision, each player’s problem is the classical Maximal Covering Location Prob-
lem (MCLP). We use the greedy add algorithm as a proxy for the follower’s response and formulate
a mixed-integer programming (MIP) model that embeds the follower’s heuristic response into the
leader’s constraints, and solve it as a single-level program. We propose and compare alternative
formulation strategies.
In our second study, we consider a network design game played on a given graph. Each player
builds her own network, maximizing individual profits. Therefore, each player’s problem given the
other’s decision is a variant of the Prize-Collecting Steiner Tree problem (PCST). We first present
an MIP formulation that finds a pure strategy Nash-equilibrium when the players decide simultane-
ously. Then we consider a Stackelberg setting and present a heuristic reformulation strategy for the
follower’s problem based on a pruning algorithm.
1
Finally, we consider the university and job application processes, where an applicant to a par-
ticular institution may increase the probability of receiving an offer by demonstrating her interest in
that institution. We characterize the optimal set of institutions to which a candidate should demon-
strate interest (i.e., send costly signals) from among the set of institutions to which she has applied.
We demonstrate that a greedy algorithm implements the optimal decision rule. In addition, we show
that the problem can be posed as a nontraditional longest path problem, for which we introduce a
more efficient dynamic programming algorithm and which we can formulate using only affine con-
straints.
2
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Optimization and Competition
Network design problems, in general, are fairly easy to describe yet computationally difficult to
solve. The existence of multiple rational decision makers (DMs) make this decision-making process
even more demanding. The reason is that a DM has not only to find an optimal solution to her
problem, but also has to consider rational responses of other DMs, whose decisions may alter her
results.
Problems involving multiple DMs are the subject of game theory and have been studied by
mathematicians and economists over several decades. A specific type of these problems, introduced
in 1934 by von Stackelberg (2011, English translation), is the Stackelberg game, in which two firms
engage in a leader–follower competition over production quantity. The leader is the first mover in
the game. His decision is observed by the follower and is responded to. Depending on the structure
of the game, the leader may or may not have a first mover’s advantage. In these games, the goal is to
arrive at a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which is to solve the problem from the leader’s point
of view ensuring that the follower’s response is optimal given the leader’s decision. These problems
yield extensive insight about the economic behavior of humans. However, in the context in which
they are studied in economics, they do not aim to solve real-world scale problems.
3
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Leader’s
problem
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
min fL(x; y
)
s.t. gL(x; y)  0
y 2 argmin fF (x; y)
s.t. gF (x; y)  0
y 2 Y
9>=>;Follower’sresponse
x 2 X; y 2 Y
Figure 1.1: A generic bilevel program
Their introduction to operations research occurred in the early 1970’s by Bracken and McGill
(1973). Candler and Norton (1977) coined the term multilevel (bilevel for two DMs) programming.
The leader’s problem is generally called the upper level problem and the follower’s problem is called
the lower level problem. Figure 1.1 illustrates a generic bilevel program, where subscripts L and F
denote the leader and the follower, respectively. f and g and indicate their functions and constraints,
respectively. x 2 X and y 2 Y are, respectively, the leader’s and the follower’s decision variables,
and y correspond to the optimal response of the follower given a particular leader decision x.
Bilevel programs generalize the idea of sequential nonzero-sum games and are useful in modeling
problems with competition. However, these nested programs suffer heavily from computational
complexity, mainly because checking the feasibility of a particular solution is itself an optimization
problem hence is as difficult as the lower level problem. Even in the simplest case, in which both
upper and lower level problems are linear, the resulting bilevel linear programming problem is in the
complexity class NP-hard, as shown by Jeroslow (1985). Ben-Ayed and Blair (1990) uses a simpler
argument involving the integer Knapsack problem and a bilevel representation of 0-1 variables.
Network design problems involve binary decisions; hence, their bilevel versions are intrinsically
more difficult than bilevel linear programming. Jeroslow (1985) shows that these belong to higher
complexity classes; for instance, decision problem of the bilevel integer program belongs to 2
in polynomial hierarchy. For more information on computational complexity readers can refer to
Arora and Barak (2009) and Papadimitriou (1994). Detailed discussions of polynomial hierarchy
4
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can be found in Stockmeyer (1977) and Papadimitriou (1994, chapter 17). As a result, several
solution methods have been developed for integer bilevel programming problems. Next, we are
going to briefly discuss some of these methods. Then, we are going to discuss application areas
of bilevel programming. Finally, we are going to provide an outline of the dissertation research
and discuss our contributions. A comprehensive discussion of these is beyond the scope of this
dissertation. Interested readers can refer to reviews by Colson et al. (2007), Dempe (2003) and
Vicente and Calamai (1994); books by Dempe (2002) and Bard (1998); and bilevel programming
related articles in Encyclopedia of Optimization (Floudas and Pardalos, 2009).
1.1.1 Solution Methods
Linear bilevel programs have been studied extensively and information on methods and applications
can be found in the aforementioned references. We are going to briefly investigate solution method-
ologies for bilevel programs, which include integer variables in at least one of the levels. They are
deemed very hard to deal with as they bring serious algorithmic challenges, such as relaxations and
fathoming rules which do not work as in the case of standard mixed integer programs. Perhaps
mainly for that reason, these problems have attracted quite limited attention. Vicente and Calamai
(1994) provide a large bibliography of the early developments. Almost all are related to problems
without integrality constraints and the authors only cite four papers (Moore and Bard, 1990; Wen
and Yang, 1990; Bard and Moore, 1992; Edmunds and Bard, 1992) that are related to integer bilevel
programs. The earliest solution approach for integer bilevel programs that we know of is by Moore
and Bard (1987), which is probably published as Bard and Moore (1992).
Moore and Bard (1990) introduce a basic implicit enumeration scheme that mirrors the branch-
and-bound procedure for solving mixed integer programs. The algorithm is designed for mixed in-
teger linear bilevel programs that can have integer variables on both levels. The algorithm generates
upper bounds (for minimization) by discarding the lower level objective. It continues with solving
the relaxed problem and branches when the solution is nonintegral. Then it fixes the leader’s vari-
ables, and solves the follower’s problem to obtain a bilevel feasible solution and hopefully a lower
5
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bound. It continues in this manner until the bounds are tolerably close.
Wen and Yang (1990) study a mixed integer bilevel linear program in which integrality con-
straints exist only for the leader’s decision variables and constraints are common for both decision
makers. They implement a standard branch-and-bound algorithm. They start by solving the fol-
lower’s problem and then the leader’s problem, setting integer variables to zero. They use the ob-
jective and dual solutions in the upper bounding step (they consider a maximization problem) and
update this bound as they branch on variables by sensitivity analysis. They also propose a heuristic
procedure that runs in as many iterations as the number of integer variables. They develop an index
to select which integer variables to set to one.
Bard and Moore (1992) take a simple path in solving a pure zero-one integer bilevel program-
ming problem. They use the branch-and-bound approach for solving standard integer programs. On
the other hand, they switch the leader’s and the follower’s objectives and solve the overall problem
for the follower. They replace the leader’s (maximization) objective with a parameterized constraint
of the form (F (x)  ). They control the number of ones among the leader’s binary decision
variables by another parameterized constraint (
P
x  ). One important detail is that they assume
the constraint and objective coefficients to be integral. They adjust these bounds, increasing the
leader’s objective until it becomes infeasible to do so anymore. Edmunds and Bard (1992) intro-
duce an algorithm to solve mixed integer nonlinear bilevel programs. The programs they consider
have binary integrality constraints for the leader’s decision and a convex leader objective function.
On the other hand, the follower’s objective is convex quadratic and his constraints are linear. They
use the common trick for linear follower programs, and use the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions to
represent it. They propose a branch-and-bound algorithm. Their approach is the same as the branch-
and-bound approach for solving standard mixed integer programs except that they also branch on
the complementarity constraints. This is also similar to associating a binary variable (u) to each
complementarity constraint, and fixing the primal function value (g()  0) or multiplier (  0) to
zero by, respectively, either (g() M(u  1)) or ( M(u)). Bard’s collected studies also appear
in Bard (1998, Ch. 6).
6
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After branch-and-bound, the second approach that comes to mind is cutting planes. Thirwani
and Arora (1997) introduce a cutting plane algorithm to solve the integer linear fractional bilevel
programs. The algorithm starts by finding an integer solution for the leader’s problem. Then the
follower’s problem is solved to check for optimality (i.e. if the leader anticipated the optimal re-
sponse). Then a special cut is added to find the next best integer solution, which is then checked for
optimality. Nonintegral solutions are solved until integrality using Gomory cuts. Dempe (2002, Ch.
8) describes a cutting plane approach. The procedure for computing the Chva´tal-Gomory cut is left
to an oracle, which computes a cut that a given nonintegral optimal solution (to the linear bilevel
program) violates. It is, however, not implementable in general, as the oracle is NP-Complete.
Cuts are generated and are added until the convex hull of the follower’s problem is described well
enough. Due to numerical issues this might result in premature termination with an infeasible so-
lution, where the author suggests branch-and-cut procedures would be needed. Recently, DeNegre
and Ralphs (2009) described a basic branch-and-cut algorithm. Dempe (2002) states that it would
be desirable to solve a single level program where the lower level problem is described by a set of,
perhaps heuristically generated, lower level solutions. This is especially true for the cases in which
the follower’s problem is a knapsack problem, where good approximations are readily available.
This is similar to our approach for solving the competitive facility location.
Since this class of problems are quite hard, introduction of metaheuristics is inevitable. For
instance, Wen and Huang (1996) describe a tabu search heuristic where they solve a bilevel linear
problem in which integer variables appear only in the leader’s decision. They iteratively generate
integer solutions through the heuristic procedure and solve the follower’s problem. Sahin and Ciric
(1998) introduce a dual temperature (resembling the two level structure) simulated annealing ap-
proach to solve bilevel programs in general. They report experiments on a mixed integer (binary)
bilevel nonlinear problem, which is a process layout design.
Many of the solution approaches are interested in quite restrictive types of problems. Jan and
Chern (1994) solve a separable integer monotone bilevel programming problem with monotone
objective and constraints, which are separable according to the leader and the follower variables.
7
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They propose a parametric programming approach. The main idea is that they parameterize the
leader’s variables in the follower’s problem and solve it for a number of different parameter values,
hence dividing the problem into regions. Using the results, they solve the leader’s problem and
obtain candidate solutions. A similar approach is taken by Faisca et al. (2007).
Finally, some recent works are as follows. Gumus and Floudas (2005) introduce two approaches
to solve mixed integer nonlinear bilevel programs. The first is for problems with mixed integer non-
linear leader and continuous nonlinear follower subproblems. The second is for problems with
general mixed integer nonlinear functions in the leader’s problem, and for the follower’s problem,
mixed integer nonlinear leader variables; linear, polynomial, or multilinear follower integer vari-
ables, and linear in continuous variables. Their technique is based on the reformulation of the mixed
integer follower problem as continuous through its convex hull representation, perform linearization
and solve the resulting single level problem by existing means. Saharidis and Ierapetritou (2008)
apply Benders decomposition for mixed integer bilevel linear problems, where the integer variables
are controlled only by the leader. The main idea is to fix the leader’s variables and then combine
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions and an active set approach to turn the problem into a single level
mixed integer problem. The solution reveals active constraints. Then the linear program with the
active sets are solved and dual information generates a cut that is added to the leader’s problem. In
the most recent paper we found, Mitsos (2010) solve nonlinear mixed integer bilevel programs. He
finds successively tighter lower bounds by solving a nonlinear mixed integer program, containing
all constraints and parameterized upper bounds for the follower’s objective.
1.1.2 Applications
Bilevel structures arise naturally in decentralized organizations. Bard (1983) discusses a multidi-
visional structure, in which top management is the leader and is followed by the divisions. Subor-
dinate units have their individual objectives, which are not necessarily in line with the superior’s.
The top management can influence (coordinate) them with carefully taken decisions of their own.
8
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Similarly, policy-making at the government level can be viewed from a bilevel programming per-
spective. Bard et al. (2000) models a government encouraging biofuel production through subsidies
to the petro-chemical industry. In this model, farmers respond by deciding how much of such crops
to produce in order to maximize their profit. Amouzegar and Moshirvaziri (1999) present a model
in which a central authority provides off-site disposal facilities and sets the associated prices and
taxes in order to minimize system (investment, transportation, processing) costs. In response, firms
producing hazardous waste make their location-allocation and on-site recycling decisions.
In industry models, firms and customers can be modeled in a bilevel setting. For instance,
Hobbs and Nelson (1992) applies bilevel programming in the electric utility industry for demand
side management. Whereas firms control rates and subsidize energy conservation, customers take
optimal positions in their consumption and investment in conservation. Cote et al. (2003) tackle the
joint capacity allocation and pricing problem for the airline industry and hence represent customer
behavior with regard to product attributes (i.e., fares). In a natural gas shipping case, Dempe et al.
(2005) present a model in which a natural gas shipper maximizes profits. However, the second level
problem is minimizing the cash-out penalties due to imbalances between contracted and delivered
quantities at the time of delivery.
Bilevel programming is also applied in the modeling of direct conflicts between players. In-
terdiction problems are of this type. Israeli and Wood (2002) studies the problem of interdicting
(destroy or increase cost) the arcs of an enemy network. The attacker’s objective is to maximize
the shortest path length, which is the enemy’s optimization problem—between two nodes. Another
interdiction scenario is studied in Scaparra and Church (2008), based on the classical p-median
problem. The leader defends the system by selecting facilities to fortify, and an interdictor attacks a
given number of facilities to maximize the damage.
Another area in which bilevel programming has attracted significant attention is traffic planning.
These problems are similar to the first interdiction example above in construction, since the network
use is optimized by the users (e.g. they find shortest paths). Some examples are mentioned below
and a survey of these problems can be found in Migdalas (1995). Ben-Ayed et al. (1992) designs a
9
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highway network taking into account the reaction of users to improvements made by the designer.
Labbe et al. (1998), on the other hand, considers the problem of revenue maximization through toll
setting on highways. Drivers respond by altering their driving routes by finding the least-cost (time
and money) travel path. In a similar study, Kara and Verter (2004) minimizes risk of transporting
dangerous goods by selecting a subset of roads through which dangerous goods can be transported.
Firms respond by minimizing their travel costs over the allowed roads.
Bilevel programming is also applied in chemical engineering and bioengineering in the design
and control of optimized systems. For example, Clark and Westerberg (1990) optimize a chemical
process by controlling temperature and pressure. The resulting system reaches equilibrium as it
naturally minimizes Gibbs free energy and this constitutes the second level problem. Burgard et al.
(2003) apply the idea to a bioengineering problem. They develop gene deletion strategies to facil-
itate overproduction of amino acids by the cell. The cell is the follower, responding by optimizing
its growth objective subject to biochemical constraints.
1.2 Contributions and Dissertation Outline
Our novel contribution is a method to reformulate these problems so that they are more tractable
(unlike the originals) and still bear a high representation power (like the originals). We reformulate
the lower-level problems as a heuristic that is specifically developed for that type of problem and
embed them into the leader’s problem as linear constraints. The major benefit of heuristic lower-
level reformulation is being able to solve the problem as an ordinary single-level problem, for which
methods and software are ample. Moreover, the heuristics often describe the lower-level problem so
accurately that the resulting upper-level solutions are near-optimal. Our computational experiments
support these claims, demonstrating reasonably short solution times with low average errors.
This idea relates to the bounded rationality concept of economics. Bounded rationality, intro-
duced by Simon (1955), emerged as an argument against the (unquestioned) assumption of rational-
ity on the part of the decision makers in the 1950’s and has become a cornerstone of decision theory
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since. It relies on empirical evidence regarding satisficing decision makers (employing heuristics),
rather than optimizing ones, especially under circumstances where the optimizing capability or will-
ingness of the decision maker is limited.
The study of network design under competition is interested in devising strategies for the leader
players, and also in how certain networks would evolve without a central decision maker, especially
if the network is important to other stakeholders that are not involved in the decision making process.
In this dissertation, we present our research on three network problems involving competition.
Facility Location: In our first research topic, we study competition in a fundamental facility
location problem—maximal covering. We develop a mathematical programming model to devise a
reasonable strategy for a first mover firm, which engages in Stackelberg competition against a fol-
lower. The follower problem is described using a greedy heuristic and is encoded into the leader’s
problem as linear constraints. We present alternative formulations from different players’ point
of views and then investigate some analytical properties (e.g., bounds) of the method. Our com-
putational analysis demonstrates, numerically, that the method suggests good—optimal in many
cases—strategies.
Distribution Network Design: As our second research topic, we study competition in a dis-
tribution network design — prize-collecting Steiner tree — game. Each player wants to maximize
her profit — node revenue minus arc costs. We develop a model for simultaneous-move setting that
finds a pure strategy Nash equilibrium solution. Then we follow a similar approach as in the first
topic and define the game as a leader-follower game and introduce a method to find reasonable and
good strategies for the leader firm. Here, as a difference from the first topic, we restrict the decision
space of the follower, but solve the problem optimally on this restricted space.
College Admissions: We discuss the university and job application process, which does not
resemble a network design problem at first sight. The university application process, for instance,
involves two parties — schools and students. A student applies to a group of schools and demon-
strates her interest through costly signals (e.g., school visit) within a budget (e.g., time). These
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signals can increase the student’s chances of being accepted. We devote the last study to the charac-
terization of the optimal set of institutions to demonstrate interest. This constitutes a first step in the
analysis of the game, which is expected to continue with the analysis of the school side in the future.
We first show that this problem can be solved with a greedy algorithm. Then, we restate the prob-
lem as a longest path problem and propose a dynamic programming algorithm. This algorithm can
be implemented using linear constraints, hence allows us to formulate the student problem exactly,
which we plan to use in our future study.
The reformulation idea shows itself in three different ways in these problems. In the facility
location case, we use a heuristic algorithm, keeping the follower decision space intact, except for
the reduction caused by the constraints. In the distribution system design problem, we restrict the
opponent to respond on a collection of trees, but the proposed formulation solves the restricted
follower problem optimally. Finally, in the college admissions problem, the reformulation yields
an optimal solution for the unrestricted problem and hence is capable of solving a bilevel problem
whose lower level problem can be solved by the algorithm we proposed.
This dissertation is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, we present our research on the com-
petitive maximal covering location problem. In Chapter 3, we study the simultaneous-move and
Stackelberg versions of the competitive prize-collecting Steiner tree problem. In Chapter 4, we an-
alyze the college admissions problem in light of demonstrated interest. Each chapter includes its
own literature review regarding the discussed topic. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes with a summary
of results and brief discussion of future research.
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Chapter 2
A Competitive Facility Location
Problem
2.1 Introduction
Facility location problems are pivotal in strategic decision making. Most firms face some sort of
facility location problem, and these problems are often difficult to solve. For instance, the set
covering, p-median, p-center problems are all in the complexity class NP-Hard. Classical facility
location models tend to ignore the effect of competition on the location decision and assume there
were a single decision maker. This is reasonable for locating public facilities like airports or fire
stations, which have virtually no competitors. However, in a market, taking competitors’ responses
into account in the location decisions can significantly alter the resulting solutions and improve the
realized outcomes.
In this chapter, we consider a competitive version of the Maximal Covering Location Problem
(MCLP). There are two firms, who engage in a Stackelberg game, thus sequentially enter a new
market. Each firm enters the market by locating multiple facilities, which are selected from a dis-
crete set of potential facilities. Once the locations are decided, customers patronize their preferred
facilities. The goal of each firm is to maximize the total customer demand that they serve at the end
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of the game. The second mover (i.e the follower) observes the first mover’s (i.e. leader’s) decision
and responds optimally. We assume foresight on the part of the leader, and we solve her problem,
taking the follower’s optimal (i.e. best) response into account. The customers are represented as a
discrete set of points and their demands are assumed to be deterministic.
The difficulty in solving this model comes from two sources. To begin with, MCLP is an NP-
hard problem (Megiddo et al., 1983). Therefore, no polynomial time algorithm is known to solve
it. However, this is not really the biggest problem, as large instances of these problems can be dealt
with efficiently. The major difficulty in solving this problem is that it has a bilevel structure, with
conflicting objectives, and each of the levels can be viewed as an instance of MCLP, given the other.
Our approach aims to overcome this difficulty by replacing the follower’s problem with a rea-
sonable heuristic, embedding this heuristic into the leader’s problem as constraints, and thus solving
the initially bilevel problem as a single-level problem.
We provide an introductory review of the literature on facility location problems that deal with
competition in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3, we introduce our problem and our approach to modeling
and solving it. We present our model in Section 2.4 and discuss two alternate formulations. Sec-
tion 2.5 briefly analyzes the worst-case performance of our approach, while Section 2.6 provides
computational results on the solution performance and the quality of the solutions generated by the
proposed models. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
In this section, we provide a concise summary of significant works on competitive facility location
and draw a historical timeline introducing the predecessors of our model. Facility location prob-
lems are extensively studied and the literature on them is vast, and a general review of the facility
location literature is outside the scope of this chapter. Interested readers may refer to the books by
Daskin (1995), Drezner (1995) and Drezner and Hamacher (2002). Snyder (2010) and ReVelle and
Eiselt (2005) provide broad overviews of facility location problems. ReVelle et al. (2008) provide
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a recent bibliography on the fundamental problem types in location science. Owen and Daskin
(1998) discuss mainly dynamic and stochastic problems in facility location. Snyder (2006) dis-
cusses stochastic and robust facility location models. Klose and Drexl (2005) discuss mixed integer
programming models in a wide range of facility location problems.
We can describe competitive facility location problems as any facility location problem that
incorporates spatial competition among at least two firms. The decisions of these firms are inter-
dependent and affect each other’s market share. Competitive problems within the facility location
field can be traced back to the seminal work by Hotelling (1929). Hotelling introduced a market
that is represented by a line segment. Two firms, whose locations on this market are known, com-
pete by setting their prices to maximize their profits. He also discussed a case in which the first
firm’s location is fixed. The result asserts that the second firm locates itself arbitrarily close to the
first one, which extends to the sameness of the product features and the positions taken by politi-
cal parties. Considering location as an attribute of the product (e.g., store) gave rise to a plethora
of studies. Hotelling’s model has been revisited several times with different settings for strategic
variables, moving sequences, customer preferences and number of firms; including a correction by
d’Aspremont et al. (1979). Reviews of these models can be found in Gabszewicz and Thisse (1992),
Anderson et al. (1992), Eiselt (2011), and Younies and Eiselt (2011). These location models on a
line are very effective in providing theoretical insights about spatial competition but their represen-
tative power fails to deal with the facility location problems that operations research mainly works
on. Therefore, in the early 1980’s several studies were introduced to incorporate competition among
decision makers into the classical facility location problems.
One of the earliest attempts was by Hakimi (1983), who extended the linear decision space in
the Hotelling model to a network. He studied locating a fixed number of new facilities on a network
where there were some existing facilities. Customers are located on the vertices and they have
associated weights. Each customer prefers the closest open facility. Finally, the decision maker’s
objective is to maximize the weighted sum of customers who prefer his facilities.
Eiselt et al. (1993) provide a five-criteria (space, number of players, pricing policy, number of
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players and behavior of customers) taxonomy of competitive facility location problems and clas-
sify more than one hundred articles accordingly. Several papers survey parts of this classification.
Plastria (2001) presents a survey on static competition in facility location and a large section on
classification. Eiselt and Laporte (1996) report on sequential models, mostly of the leader–follower
type of facility location problems. Serra and ReVelle (1995) provide a discussion of competitive
location in discrete space, which also brings together several of the models that will be explained
below. Most recently, Kress and Pesch (2012) surveyed recent developments in sequential compet-
itive location problems.
The problem we address originates from the maximal covering location problem (MCLP) intro-
duced by Church and ReVelle (1974). In the classical MCLP, customers are represented as demand
points and they can be served only by a facility within a pre-specified service distance. The deci-
sion maker locates a fixed number of facilities in order to maximize the total demand covered by
the facilities. The MCLP is one of the pillars of facility location and numerous variants have been
studied. Snyder (2011) reviews covering problems including a detailed discussion of the MCLP.
Note that this original problem does not consider competition. ReVelle (1986) extends the
MCLP to the competitive domain and introduces the maximum capture (MAXCAP) problem. This
is an example of static competition. The decision maker locates a fixed number of facilities in a
market where competing facilities already exist, just as the follower in our problem does. Each
customer prefers the closest open facility and the demand is equally shared if the closest open
facilities of each firm are at equal distance from the customer. This problem is, in fact, equivalent
to the p-median problem as covering, capturing and sharing are expressable as the weight of an
edge between a facility and a customer. In a subsequent paper Serra et al. (1996) consider demand
uncertainty for the MAXCAP problem.
Serra and ReVelle (1994) reformulate the MAXCAP as a Stackelberg-type problem (compe-
tition with foresight). The game described in the MAXCAP stays the same but now the leader’s
problem is solved. This model is named the preemptive capture problem. For reasons we explain in
the coming sections, this problem is quite hard to formulate and solve as an IP. Serra and ReVelle
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describe a simple heuristic procedure to solve the problem. The leader locates her facilities first.
The follower responds by solving the MAXCAP problem. Then the leader follows a one-opt pro-
cedure, exchanging a single open facility with a closed one at each iteration and re-solving for the
follower’s response. The new solution is accepted if the leader’s demand increases and the proce-
dure is continued until no more improvements are achieved. An interesting variant of the problem
is described by Serra and ReVelle (1995), in which the number of facilities to be opened by the
opponent is defined probabilistically, and the probability monotonically decreases as the number of
leader facilities increases.
Finally, Plastria and Vanhaverbeke (2008) revisit the problem and formulate three MIP models,
robust models MaxMin, MinRegret, and Stackelberg, where they restrict the follower decision to a
single facility. This assumption allows them to formulate the problem without needing a bilevel for-
mulation. In the models we present below, we extend their Stackelberg approach to allow multiple
follower facilities. However, we do not solve for an exact Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium; rather, we
describe the follower response heuristically.
From a mathematical programming perspective, our problem is a 0-1 integer bilevel linear pro-
gramming problem (IBLP), where the upper and lower levels correspond to the leader’s and the
follower’s decision stages, respectively. (See Colson et al. (2007) for a recent review of bilevel pro-
gramming.) There are a few solution approaches, including classical branch-and-bound (Bard and
Moore, 1992; Moore and Bard, 1990), cutting planes, and branch-and-cut variants (DeNegre and
Ralphs, 2009), that have been proposed to solve problems of this type. These algorithms typically
struggle when applied to problems with more than a few variables and constraints. More efficient
algorithms exist either for problems with continuous variables (which is still an NP-hard optimiza-
tion problem (Jeroslow, 1985)) and problems with special exploitable structures. In general, the
existing practical needs for IBLP significantly exceed current solution capabilities (Bard, 2009).
We propose to reformulate the problem as a single-level 0-1 integer linear problem, and rep-
resent the follower’s problem by a heuristic that is formulated using additional variables and con-
straints, whose cardinality is polynomial in the original number of variables and constraints. As the
17
2.3. THE PROBLEM
heuristic does not guarantee optimal solutions for the follower, the result is not guaranteed to be
optimal for the leader. On the other hand, computational experiments show that the model performs
quite well in terms of computational effort and solution quality.
2.3 The Problem
Before discussing the model, we introduce the problem and related terminology. Then, we describe
the mechanics of the underlying Stackelberg game and how we embed the follower’s problem into
the leader’s constraints.
In our model, there are two competing firms, the leader (L) and the follower (F ). Both firms
have a number of potential locations where they can build and operate facilities to serve customers.
We denote the leader’s potential locations with s 2 S and the follower’s potential locations with
t 2 T . We assume S\T = ; for the moment and in the numerical analysis in Section 2.6. However,
this assumption can be altered without changing the model as we explain later in this chapter. The
leader and the follower, respectively, open B and K facilities. Customer demand is assumed to
accumulate at a number of discrete points and we denote these points with i 2 I and the associated
demand with di. Both firms would like to maximize their profits, thus, the total demand they serve.
We define two relations among the components: coverage and preference. It is customary to
use a distance analogy for these relations. An open facility covers all the customers that are at most
a given service distance (i.e. radius) away from it. Each customer prefers the closest open facility
that covers her. If there is no open facility that covers a particular customer then that customer is
not served. Figure 2.1 illustrates a simple instance and the coverage relationship among problem
entities on a grid assuming a radius of 5 units. We represent these relations as subsets. For a given
customer i 2 I the leader [follower] locations that cover her are denoted as the subset Si  S
[Ti  T ]. We denote the set of leader facilities that customer i would prefer over the follower
location t by Sit.
The model assumes that the leader is the first mover. She first makes her decision and locates
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Figure 2.1: Customers, potential facilities and coverage relations
her facilities; then, after some time, the follower enters the market and locates his facilities. The
follower’s problem is to maximize the demand he serves, given the leader’s solution. When both
parties locate their facilities, the winner for each customer demand is decided according to the
outcome matrix presented in Table 2.1. The winner firm is said to capture the customer. Figure 2.2
illustrates the optimal solution to the specified problem forB = K = 2, and the customers captured
by each player.
Since the leader is not going to alter her solution after the follower acts, the follower does not
need to take into account any strategic response and his problem is relatively easy. It reduces to the
MCLP. On the other hand, the problem of the leader is a lot harder as she has to take into account
her opponent’s strategic response, too. This is difficult for two reasons. The follower, even though
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Table 2.1: Outcome matrix for customer i :
Winner is Leader (L), Follower (F), none (X) or situation is impossible (I)
Leader, s
s 2 Si
s =2 Si s 2 Sit s =2 Sit
Follower, t
t =2 Ti 1 2 3X L I
t 2 Ti 4 5 6F L F
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Figure 2.2: Solution: Opened facilities and captured customers
we restrict him to open exactly K facilities, needs to solve a combinatorial optimization problem
which is known to be in the complexity class NP-hard. As almost all discrete facility location
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problems (including the MCLP) are in this category, this is not surprising. The bad news is that
the follower’s objective conflicts with the leader’s, yet has to be optimized in the leader’s problem.
Since we are not able to put the follower’s objective in the objective function next to the leader’s,
we ensure that the follower’s problem is solved optimally through constraints, basically by making
each suboptimal follower solution infeasible to the leader’s problem, as follows:
max LeaderCapture(L;F ) (2.1)
s.t. : : : (2.2)
FollowerCapture(L;F )  FollowerCapture(L;F 0) 8F 0 (2.3)
Here, L and F denote the leader’s and the follower’s location vectors, respectively. The follower has
C(jT j;K) possible choices. This value is very large for large jT j and gets larger as K approaches
jT j=2. Therefore the number of required constraints (2.3) increases very fast, becoming hard to
manage even for problems of moderate size. Plastria and Vanhaverbeke (2008) solve this problem
by setting K = 1. They assume that the follower responds by opening a single facility, therefore
keeping the number of constraints small.
Instead, we propose the following approach. We don’t solve the follower’s problem optimally,
but replace it with a heuristic solution. We assume that the follower implements the greedy add al-
gorithm given the locations of the leader facilities. The algorithm is described in Section 2.4.2. The
leader views this heuristic as a proxy for her opponent’s true optimal response, thus maximizes the
total demand covered by her facilities assuming that the follower responds by applying his heuristic.
We now introduce the rest of the notation and explain the proposed model and the accompanying
heuristic.
21
2.4. THE MODEL
2.4 The Model
2.4.1 Terminology and Notation
We revisit the sets and parameters, and introduce the variables of the model.
Sets
I: customers
S: potential leader facilities. Subset Si denotes the set of facilities that can serve (cover)
customer i 2 I . Subset Sit denotes the set of leader facilities that customer i would
prefer to the follower facility t.
T : potential follower facilities. Subset Ti denotes the set of follower facilities that cover
customer i 2 I .
Parameters
di: demand of customer i 2 I
B: number of facilities that the leader will open
K: number of facilities that the follower will open, hence the number of greedy add algorithm
iterations.
Decision Variables
Ls: binary variable that equals 1 if the leader opens facility s.
Ftk: binary variable that equals 1 if the follower opens facility t at the kth iteration of the
greedy add algorithm.
xLi : binary variable that equals 1 if customer i is captured by the leader.
xFik: binary variable that equals 1 if customer i is captured by the follower facility opened at
the kth iteration of the greedy add algorithm.
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yitk: binary variable that equals 1 if customer i is still capturable by the follower facility
t 2 Ti in the kth iteration of the greedy add algorithm (definition of “capturable” to be
made more precise later).
Although we define the last three variables as binary variables, we will show that if they are
defined as continuous variables, the problem will still have an all-integer solution.
2.4.2 Follower’s Response
Let us now analyze our assumption on the follower’s response. The greedy add procedure (Kuehn
and Hamburger, 1963) is as follows. At the beginning, all follower locations are closed. The
follower receives the decision vector L = [Ls] from the leader and updates the y variables. If a
customer i can be covered by a particular follower facility t, then the customer is still capturable at
iteration k (yitk = 1) if there is no better open leader facility, otherwise it is not (yitk = 0). Then
for each facility that is still closed, the follower calculates the total demand that the facility could
capture if it were open (
P
i2I diyitk). The facility that can capture the largest demand (t
0) is opened.
The customers who were capturable by this facility are captured (xFik  1) and are removed from
further consideration (yitk0  0 for k0 > k). This is repeated until the follower opens K facilities.
This algorithm is included as a feasibility problem through constraints in the leader’s model, as
described in Section 2.4.3.
We selected this algorithm as the follower’s response mainly for two reasons. First, the greedy
add algorithm is a well-known procedure for facility location problems. The quality of the solution it
provides depends heavily on the characteristics of the underlying graph for the follower’s problem.
It does not guarantee optimality in the majority of the cases, but worst case bounds exist. The
second reason is that it enables us to embed the follower’s response into the leader’s problem using
a polynomial number of new constraints. (In contrast, recall from Section 2.3 that a straightforward
embedding of the follower’s problem into the leader’s would require an exponential number of
constraints.) In the computational study, we discuss this and the effectiveness of the approach. Next
we introduce and explain our mathematical model.
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2.4.3 Leader’s Problem
The leader aims to maximize the demand she captures. The objective function is therefore
X
i2I
dix
L
i ; (2.4)
the total demand captured by the leader. The leader is going to open at most B facilities, enforced
with the constraint
X
s2S
Ls  B: (2.5)
Note thatB can also be interpreted as an investment budget if we introduce a fixed cost of investment
for each facility. The greedy add algorithm requires exactly one follower facility to be opened at
each iteration k = 1; : : : ;K.
X
t2T
Ftk = 1 8k = 1; : : : ;K: (2.6)
A particular follower facility t 2 T can be opened at most once throughout the algorithm.
KX
k=1
Ftk  1 8t 2 T: (2.7)
A particular customer i 2 I can be captured by at most one of the firms.
xLi +
KX
k=1
xFik  1 8i 2 I: (2.8)
The leader has to have an open and covering facility to capture customer i. That is, xLi = 1) 9s 2
Si such that Ls = 1, or equivalently Ls = 0 8s 2 Si ) xLi = 0.
xLi 
X
s2Si
Ls 8i 2 I: (2.9)
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The above requirement is valid for the follower, too. xFik = 1 ) 9t 2 Ti such that Ftk = 1 or
equivalently Ftk = 0 8t 2 Ti ) xFik = 0.
xFik 
X
t2Ti
Ftk 8i 2 I; k = 1; : : : ;K: (2.10)
After the leader’s decision is finalized we need to determine whether a customer i is still capturable
by a covering facility t 2 Ti. This is the initialization step of the greedy add algorithm. The
following two constraints determine if a customer is still capturable by a facility. Given a customer
i and a covering potential follower facility t, if the leader has no better facility than t, then i can be
capturable by the follower by opening facility t. We denote this situation as yit1 = 1.
1  yit1 
X
s2Sit
Ls 8i 2 I; t 2 Ti: (2.11)
On the other hand, if the leader opens a better facility s 2 Sit then the follower cannot capture
customer i through facility t. We denote this situation as yit1 = 0.
1  yit1  Ls 8i 2 I; t 2 Ti; s 2 Sit: (2.12)
For the remaining iterations (k  2) we update the value of yitk as follows: if i is initially capturable
(yit1 = 1) and it is not captured by the follower yet (
P
k0<k x
F
ik0 = 0) it is still capturable (yitk = 1).
yitk  yit1  
k 1X
k0=1
xFik0 8i 2 I; t 2 Ti; k = 2; : : : ;K: (2.13)
A customer becomes noncapturable once it is captured.
yitk  1 
k 1X
k0=1
xFik0 8i 2 I; t 2 Ti; k = 2; : : : ;K: (2.14)
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Finally, a noncapturable customer stays noncapturable.
yitk  yi;t;k 1 8i 2 I; t 2 Ti; k = 2; : : : ;K: (2.15)
The greedy add algorithm is implemented through the following constraints. At each iteration k,
the follower captures a total demand that is equal to the demand capturable by any single follower
facility.
X
i2I:t2Ti
diyitk 
X
i2I
dix
F
ik 8t 2 T; k = 1; : : : ;K: (2.16)
At iteration k, customer i is captured if the follower opens a covering facility t and the customer is
capturable by t.
xFik  Ftk + yitk   1 8i 2 I; t 2 Ti; k = 1; : : : ;K: (2.17)
On the other hand, customer i is not captured if the follower opens a covering facility t but the
customer is not capturable by t.
xFik  1  Ftk + yitk 8i 2 I; t 2 Ti; k = 1; : : : ;K: (2.18)
Taken together, (2.10), (2.17), and (2.18) ensure that xFik = 1 if and only if i was captured by the
follower facility opened at iteration k. Finally, the variables have the following restrictions.
Ls; Ftk 2 f0; 1g 8s 2 S; t 2 T; k = 1; : : : ;K; (2.19)
xLi ; x
F
ik; yitk  0 8i 2 I; t 2 Ti; k = 1; : : : ;K: (2.20)
Theorem 1. The formulation above ensures the outcomes of the game depicted in Table 2.1.
Proof. Each of the six cases (cells) in the outcome matrix are satisfied as follows.
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1. If Ls = 0 for all s 2 Si and Ftk = 0 for all t 2 Ti, then xLi = 0 and xFik = 0 by constraints
(2.9) and (2.10), respectively.
2. If Ftk = 0 for all t 2 Ti and k = 1; : : : ;K and there is at least one s 2 Si such that Ls = 1,
then xFik = 0 for all k by constraint (2.10), and x
L
i  1 by (2.9) and (2.8). Then, xLi = 1
because the leader maximizes total captured demand.
3. The case is impossible because if s 2 Si but t 62 Ti, customer prefers s to t, thus s 2 Sit.
4. If Ls = 0 for all s 2 Si and there is at least one t 2 Ti such that Ftk = 1, then xFik = 1 by
constraints (2.17) and (2.8).
5. If there is an s 2 Sit such that Ls = 1, for each t 2 Ti with Ftk = 1, then yitk = 0 for such t
by constraints (2.12) and (2.15). Then xFik = 0 by (2.18). x
L
i = 1 as in case 2.
6. If there is a t 2 Ti such that Ftk = 1 but Ls = 0 for all s 2 Sit then yit1 = 1, and yitk = 0 if
xik0 = 1 for some k0 < k by (2.14), or yitk = 1 and xi;k = 1 by (2.17).
Theorem 2. Variables xLi , xFik and yitk assume binary values in the optimal solution.
Proof. We have yit1 2 [maxf0; 1  
P
s2Sit Lsg; 1   maxs2SitfLsg] by constraints (2.11) and
(2.12), and nonnegativity constraint (2.20). Thus, given binary Ls, each yit1 is assigned a binary
value.
At iteration k0, assume we have binary Ls, Ftk0 and yitk0 . If there is no t 2 Ti such that Ftk0 = 1,
xFik0 = 0 by constraint (2.10) and yitk0+1 = yitk0 . If there is at least one such t, then given binary
yitk0 , constraints (2.17) and (2.18) imply that xFik0 = yitk0 = 1, thus binary. Therefore yitk0+1 is also
binary. Then, by induction, all xFik and yitk are binary.
If there is a k such that xFik = 1, by constraint (2.8) x
L
i = 0. If there is no s 2 Si such that
Ls = 1, by constraint (2.9) xLi = 0. If neither of these conditions are true, x
L
i = 1 as in case 5 of
Theorem 1.
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Theorem 3. Any follower response enforced by the above model corresponds to a greedy add
algorithm result.
Proof. At each iteration k, the follower facility which can capture the largest remaining demand
is opened. That is, Ftk = 1 ) t = argmaxt0f
P
i2I diyitkg. The converse is also true if the
maximizer is unique. Otherwise, there would be some t0 6= t such thatPi2I diyit0k >Pi2I diyitk.
Then
P
i2I dix
F
ik >
P
i2I diyitk by (2.16). However, if Ftk = 1, by (2.17) and (2.18), x
F
ik = yitk.
These constraints are only for (i; t) pairs such that t 2 Ti, yet constraints (2.6) and (2.10) imply that
for all i such that t 62 Ti, xFik = 0. Therefore,
P
i2I dix
F
ik =
P
i2I diyitk, which is a contradiction.
Also it follows that all of the demand capturable by t is captured and no noncapturable demand
is captured. A total ofK facilities are opened in this manner and the result is a greedy add algorithm
solution.
Note that the greedy add algorithm may return different solutions and total captured demands
for the follower if one does not use a stable selection procedure between the multiple maximizers
of an iteration. In the model stated above, if there are multiple maximizers at a step of the greedy
add algorithm, then the optimal solution selects the one that would result in the greatest objective
value for the leader. To avoid this optimistic outcome, we can introduce a stable selection procedure
for the multiple maximizers of an iteration. An example procedure could be defining a precedence
order for the follower (e.g., index of the facility) such that the ties are resolved according to that
order (e.g., select the one with the least index). We can enforce such a selection rule by introducing
the following constraint.
X
i2I
diyitk  
X
i2I
dix
F
ik + tFtk 
X
t02T
t0Ft0k 8t 2 T; k = 1; : : : ;K: (2.21)
where t 2 (0;minifdig) and t > t0 if and only if t precedes t0 on the selection rule. This way
the ties would be solved in favor of the first alternative according to the precedence order.
The leader solves Problem 4. We refer to the following formulation as CMCLP1.
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Problem 4 (Competitive MCLP with Heuristic Follower Response).
max
X
i2I
dix
L
i (2.4)
s.t.
X
s2S
Ls  B (2.5)
X
t2T
Ftk = 1 8k = 1; : : : ;K (2.6)
KX
k=1
Ftk  1 8t 2 T (2.7)
xLi +
KX
k=1
xFik  1 8i 2 I (2.8)
xLi 
X
s2Si
Ls 8i 2 I (2.9)
xFik 
X
t2Ti
Ftk 8i 2 I; k = 1; : : : ;K (2.10)
1  yit1 
X
s2Sit
Ls 8i 2 I; t 2 Ti (2.11)
1  yit1  Ls 8i 2 I; t 2 Ti; s 2 Sit (2.12)
yitk  yitk 1   xFik 1 8i 2 I; t 2 Ti; k = 2; : : : ;K (2.13)
yitk  1 
k 1X
k0=1
xFik0 8i 2 I; t 2 Ti; k = 2; : : : ;K (2.14)
yitk  yitk 1 8i 2 I; t 2 Ti; k = 2; : : : ;K (2.15)X
i2I
diyitk 
X
i2I
dix
F
ik 8t 2 T; k = 1; : : : ;K (2.16)
xFik  Ftk + yitk   1 8i 2 I; t 2 Ti; k = 1; : : : ;K (2.17)
xFik  1  Ftk + yitk 8i 2 I; t 2 Ti; k = 1; : : : ;K (2.18)
L;F 2 f0; 1g (2.19)
xL; xF ; y  0 (2.20)
29
2.4. THE MODEL
2.4.4 Alternative Formulations
CMCLP1 has the following two features that we might alter to obtain better formulations. First,
it does not recognize which follower facility captures the customer at a given iteration. Second, it
does not assume transitivity in customer preference. It has a follower point of view in defining the
capturability, which we can define alternatively from the leader’s point of view using transitivity.
CMCLP2: Identifying The Capturing Follower Facility
In CMCLP1, there is no variable that identifies which follower facility captures a given customer
at a given iteration. This information is retrievable using xFik and Ftk once the problem is solved.
We introduce the variable xFitk, which equals 1 if customer i is captured by facility t at iteration
k. This alters the previous formulation slightly. For constraints, (2.8), (2.13), (2.14) and (2.16),
we simply replace xFik with
P
t2Ti x
F
itk because only one facility can capture a given customer in a
given iteration.
On the other hand, the new variable allows us to define stronger relationships between y, F and
xF . Facility t captures a customer only if it is open and the customer is capturable in the given
iteration.
xFitk  Ftk + yitk   1 8i 2 I; t 2 Ti; k = 1; : : : ;K (2.22)
If any of these conditions is not satisfied, the customer cannot be captured by facility t.
xFitk  Ftk 8i 2 I; t 2 Ti; k = 1; : : : ;K (2.23)
xFitk  yitk 8i 2 I; t 2 Ti; k = 1; : : : ;K (2.24)
Therefore, we can replace constraints (2.10), (2.17) and (2.18) with (2.23), (2.22) and (2.24), re-
spectively. Finally, we can obtain an improvement in constraint (2.15), which can be altered as
30
2.4. THE MODEL
yitk  yitk 1   xFitk 1. Introducing the new index increases the number of variables and con-
straints, but the tighter constraints lead to improved performance; see Section 2.6 for more details.
CMCLP3: Capturability From The Leader’s Point Of View
CMCLP1 takes the follower’s point of view in formulating the capturability of a customer—variable
y. It relies on the set Sit that is defined for each (i; t) pair. Note that this set definition does not
assume transitive customer preference among members of S[T , even though consumer preferences
are generally transitive. If we assume transitivity, we can use an alternative and tighter formulation.
Therefore, leti be a strict total preference relation (complete, reflexive, transitive and antisymmet-
ric) over the choice set S[T . Let ties be broken (e.g. in favor of the smaller-indexed facility) before
we apply the preference relation. We introduce a new variable aisk which equals 1 if customer i
patronizes the leader facility s before iteration k—in a sense the game is played in 1 + K stages,
which represent the leader’s move and the follower’s K consecutive moves, respectively. Then we
make the following changes in CMCLP1.
At the beginning of each iteration k, customer i is either not covered by any of the opened
facilities, or patronizes a covering leader facility or has been captured by the follower at some
earlier iteration.
X
s2Si
aisk +
k 1X
k0=1
xFik0  1 8i 2 I; k = 1; : : : ;K (2.25)
At the leader’s decision stage, a customer can only patronize an open leader facility.
ais1  Ls 8i 2 I; s 2 Si (2.26)
When leader facility s is opened, the following two conditions hold. A covered customer cannot be
assigned to a less preferred facility (2.27), but it can be assigned to s or a more preferred facility
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(2.28).
Ls  1 
X
s02Si:sis0
ais01 8i 2 I; s 2 Si (2.27)
Ls 
X
s02Si:s0is
ais01 8i 2 I; s 2 Si (2.28)
A customer is considered capturable by a given follower facility t if it is not currently held by a
better leader facility and has not already been captured by the follower. At each step of the greedy
add algorithm, the left-hand side of the inequality is the total demand capturable by each follower
facility and the right-hand side equals the demand captured by the follower in that iteration. This
guarantees that the demand captured at each iteration is the largest capturable demand by a single
open facility.
X
i2I:t2Ti
di
0@1 X
s2Si:sit
aisk  
k 1X
k0=1
xFik0
1A X
i2I
dix
F
ik 8t 2 T; k = 1; : : : ;K (2.29)
Then, we have the following three counterparts of the previous model, ensuring that (2.29) holds at
equality for the opened facility. At a given iteration k, if customer i is captured, a covering follower
facility t should be open.
xFik 
X
t2Ti
Ftk 8i 2 I; k = 1; : : : ;K (2.30)
Thus, if customer i is capturable by t, and t or a better follower facility is open, i is captured (2.31).
However, if it is not capturable by t, yet the opened follower facility is t or worse, then it cannot be
captured (2.32). (This can be incorporated in the same way into CMCLP1 (but not to CMCLP2) by
replacing Ftk in (2.17) and (2.18) with
P
t02Ti:t0it Ft0k and
P
t02Ti:tit0 Ft0k, respectively.)
xFik 
X
t02Ti:t0it
Ft0k  
X
s2Si:sit
aisk  
k 1X
k0=1
xFik0 8i 2 I; t 2 Ti; k = 1; : : : ;K (2.31)
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xFik  2 
X
t02Ti:tit0
Ft0k  
X
s2Si:sit
aisk  
k 1X
k0=1
xFik0 8i 2 I; t 2 Ti; k = 1; : : : ;K (2.32)
The assignment status of customer i to a particular leader facility s, after the initial assignment in
(2.27)–(2.28) is updated in one of the following three ways. If i is not assigned to (held by) s at a
given iteration, it would not be in the subsequent iterations (2.33). If the leader was holding i and a
better follower facility was not opened, the leader continues to hold it (2.34).
aisk  aisk 1 8i 2 I; s 2 Si; k = 2; : : : ;K (2.33)
aisk  aisk 1  
X
t2Ti:ts
Ftk 1 8i 2 I; s 2 Si; k = 2; : : : ;K (2.34)
The last assignment status is converted to the leader’s updated covering relation as follows. If the
leader does not hold the customer before the last iteration (2.35), or the follower has captured it
(2.36), the leader cannot capture it. However, if both are false, the leader captures it (2.37).
xLi 
X
s2Si
aisK 8i 2 I (2.35)
xLi  1 
KX
k=1
xFik 8i 2 I (2.36)
xLi 
X
s2Si
aisK   xFiK 8i 2 I (2.37)
As a final note, L;F 2 f0; 1g whereas a; x 2 [0; 1].
2.5 Theoretical Performance
How accurate is the greedy add algorithm as an approximation of the follower’s optimal response,
and what impact does the inaccuracy have on the leader’s decision? Let L and F be the leader’s and
follower’s location vectors, respectively, and let LC(L;F ) and FC(L;F ) be the demand captured
by the leader and the follower, respectively, for given values ofL and F . Let F (L) be the follower’s
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optimal response to the leader locations L, and let FG(L) be the follower’s response if he uses the
greedy add algorithm. Finally, letL be the leader’s optimal solution if she assumes that the follower
acts optimally, and let LG be the leader’s optimal solution if she assumes that the follower uses the
greedy add algorithm. We start with an ideal, and extreme, case, in which the model solves the
bilevel program optimally.
Proposition 5. If the customers covered by the follower facilities do not overlap, F (L) = FG(L),
L = LG.
Proof. In this case, the follower’s coverage network (e.g., Figure 2.1) is a collection of stars which
have a follower facility as the internal node and customers covered by that facility as the leaves. The
leader’s decision can remove edges from this graph, but cannot add edges to it. Opening a follower
facility does not affect the stars associated with other facilities. Since there is no overlap, summing
the demand captured by individual facilities gives the objective. The objective is maximized by
selecting the best K facilities in order, which is equivalent to the greedy add algorithm. Since the
greedy add algorithm identifies the follower’s best response, the model solves the bilevel program
optimally.
This result is tight in the sense that the algorithm can fail to find the optimal solution even when
each facility shares at most one covered customer, as Figure 2.3 shows.
11/20/2011
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Customers
Follower facilities
Figure 2.3: Greedy algorithm fails: F (L) = [1; 0; 1]; FG(L) = [1; 1; 0]
The following theorem states an upper bound on the worst-case performance of the greedy add
algorithm as a heuristic for solving the follower’s problem. It is an application of a result whose
proof can be found in Hochbaum (1997).
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Theorem 6. If the follower opensK facilities, the following worst-case bound holds:
FC(L;F (L))  FC(L;FG(L))
FC(L;F (L))


1  1
K
K
: (2.38)
Moreover, limK!1
 
1  1K
K
= 1e  0:37, and it approaches from below.
Theorem 7. The worst-case bound in Theorem 6 is tight.
Proof. Worst-case examples can be generated by manipulating the the worst-case examples in Cor-
nuejols et al. (1977). One such rule is as follows. Given K, let jIj = K2, jSj = K, jT j = 2K   1
andB = K 1. Let each leader facility s cover customer i = K(K 1)+s, respectively. Let each
follower facility t < K cover customers i 2 f(t 1)K+1; :::; (t 1)K+Kg, and each t  K cover
customers i 2 ft+1 K; t+1; t+1+K; :::; t+1+(K  2)Kg. Assume the follower’s facilities
are all better than the leader’s. Finally, let the customers’ demand be di = KK 2(K 1K )
d i
K
e 1 for
i  K(K 1) and di = (K 1)K 1   otherwise, where  is an arbitrarily small positive number.
An illustration is presented in Figure 2.4.
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Figure 2.4: Worst case of greedy add algorithm,K = 3
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The greedy add algorithm would select locations t 2 f1; : : : ;Kg for each possible leader de-
cision. However, the optimal follower decision is to open t 2 fK; :::; 2K   1g and capture all
customer demand. This would give the following expressions for greedy and optimal objectives:
FC(L;FG(L)) =
K(K 1)X
i=1
KK 2(
K   1
K
)d
i
K
e 1 + (K   1)K 1   
=
K 2X
n=0
KK 1(
K   1
K
)n + (K   1)K 1   
=
K 1X
n=0
KK 1 n(K   1)n    = KK   (K   1)K   
FC(L;F (L)) = FC(L;FG(L)) +
K2X
i=K(K 1)+2

(K   1)K 1   
= KK   (K   1)K + (K   1)K  K = KK  K
Therefore, as ! 0,
FC(L;F (L))  FC(L;FG(L))
FC(L;F (L))
! (K   1)
K
KK
=

1  1
K
K
(2.39)
We can use this result to assess the worst-case performance of the greedy assumption from the
leader’s perspective. Our first such result is the following bound on the leader’s loss as a percentage
of demand that the follower greedily captures.
Theorem 8. By assuming a greedy follower response and selecting facilities L, the leader loses at
most 11 FC(L;F
G(L)), where  =
 
1  1K
K .
Proof. Let A be the subset of customers that the leader covers by selecting L, and B [C] be the
subset of customers that the follower captures if he responds greedily [optimally]. See Figure 2.5
for an illustration. Therefore, the leader expects to capture AnB, but ends up capturing AnC. This
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corresponds to losing (A\C) nB and gaining (A\B) nC. The net loss is maximized if all [none]
of the customers that the optimizing [greedy] follower captures are stolen from the leader; that is, if
(A \ C) nB = C and (A \B) n C = ;. The total demand of set C is FC(L;F (L)). Then, from
Theorem 6, we obtain FC(L;F (L)) < 11 FC(L;F
G(L)).
10/3/2011
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Demand covered by L
gain loss
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Figure 2.5: Set diagram for game outcome
On the other hand, no fixed worst-case bound exists for the leader’s percentage error when she
assumes a greedy response from the follower but the follower responds optimally. Similarly, there
is no such bound for the leader’s percentage error between the heuristic model solution and the
optimal solution to the problem.
Theorem 9. No fixed worst-case bounds exist for:
(a) LC(L;F
G(L)) LC(L;F (L))
LC(L;F (L)) , and
(b) LC(L
G;FG(LG)) LC(L;F (L))
LC(L;F (L))
Proof. For case (a), consider the worst-case example in Theorem 6 with K = 3, and let L =
[0; 1; 1]. The greedy response of the follower isFG(L) = [1; 1; 1; 0; 0] and it yieldsLC(L;FG(L)) =
8. If the follower responded optimally, he would pick F (L) = [0; 0; 1; 1; 1] and it would yield
LC(L;F (L)) = 0 since the follower facilities are better than the leader facilities for customers
7, 8 and 9. Thus, the leader expects to capture a positive demand whereas she cannot capture any
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demand in the end. This is illustrated in Figure 2.6.
LC(L;FG(L))  LC(L;F (L))
LC(L;F (L))
=1:
For case (b), consider the same example, but now introduce two new leader locations s = 4; 5, and
two new customers i = 10; 11 as in Figure 2.6. Let S10 = 4; S11 = 5; T10 = T11 = ;, and each
customer have a demand of  < 4  . The solution is LG = [0; 1; 1; 0; 0], FG(LG) = [1; 1; 1; 0; 0],
L = [0; 0; 0; 1; 1] and F (L) = [0; 0; 1; 1; 1]. These yield LC(LG; FG(LG)) = 8   2 and
LC(L; F (L)) = 2. When  approaches 0:
LC(LG; FG(LG))  LC(L; F (L))
LC(L; F (L))
!1:
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Figure 2.6: Worst case of greedy add algorithm,K = 3
These results are for the limited-coverage case. However, they still hold if we assume an infinite
coverage radius, too. The follower always solves a limited-coverage problem, because the follower’s
coverage is updated (and becomes limited) once the leader makes his decision. The same worst-case
examples can be generated for the infinite coverage case by carefully constructing the preference
relations.
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Finally, we present a modification of the proposed models. We will show that solving the models
with this modification yields an upper bound for the demand that the leader captures. Such an upper
bound is not difficult to obtain. For instance, if we solve the classical MCLP (i.e., no follower) for
the leader, the result is clearly an upper bound on the leader’s capture. Consequently, if we restrict
the follower to open K facilities and capture customers according to the game rules, but do not
attempt to optimize the follower’s response, we obtain a tighter upper bound. In this case the leader
can pick any follower response, but incur the associated demand loss.
Our modification is done as follows. First, we introduce variables F^t and x^Fi . They indicate,
respectively, whether a facility is opened and if a customer is captured by the follower. Constraint
(2.40) requires the follower to open K facilities. Constraints (2.41)–(2.44) ensure that the follower
takes all the facilities that it can capture with the open facilities and no more. Finally, (2.45) ensures
that the opened facilities capture at least as much as the greedy follower response. The modification
is done by replacing (2.8) in Model 4 with (2.44) below and adding the remaining constraints to the
model. We show that the modified model is an upper bound on the leader’s capture in Theorem 10.
X
t2T
F^t = K (2.40)
x^Fi 
X
t2Ti
F^t 8i 2 I (2.41)
x^Fi  F^t + yit;1   1 8i 2 I; t 2 Ti (2.42)
xLi  Ls  
X
t2Ti:s62Sit
F^t 8i 2 I; s 2 Si (2.43)
x^Fi + x
L
i  1 8i 2 I (2.44)X
i2T
X
t2Ti
KX
k=1
dix
F
itk 
X
i2I
dix^
F
i (2.45)
Theorem 10. The modified model is an upper bound on the leader’s optimal captureLC(L; F (L)).
Proof. The modification below allows the leader to pick any of the follower’s K facilities as long
as it is better than (or equal to) the greedy follower response given L. Since the follower’s optimal
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response is always better than or equal to his greedy response, the solution to the modified problem
is always greater than or equal to leader’s optimal capture LC(L; F (L)).
2.6 Computational Study
2.6.1 Experimental Design
We tested our model using two data sets from Daskin (1995). The first set includes the geographical
coordinates and populations of 88 cities. These are the 50 largest US cities according to the 1990
census and the 48 continental state capitals, less the double entries. The second set includes the
geographical coordinates of the 150 largest US cities according to the 1990 census. The first set
represents the customers, thus jIj = 88, and we used their populations as customer demands. We
randomly selected the potential facilities from the second set. We selected 11 settings for the number
of potential facilities, changing jSj and jT j. We further decided on 20 problem types by changing
the model size parameters (K;B) and radius (r). The radius (given in miles) is the key to generating
the coverage and preference relationships. Each location is assumed to have a coverage radius given
by r, and each customer prefers facilities in order of distance. For each problem type, we generated
50 instances by randomly picking potential leader and follower locations. We discarded duplicate
locations, thus each instance consists of distinct locations for the leader and the follower. In total,
we solved 1000 instances. The problem types and their properties are summarized in Table 2.2.
2.6.2 Solution Statistics
We coded the model using AMPL and solved the instances using CPLEX 12.2 on a Pentium Xeon
3.0 GHz (x2) 64 bit computer. We used a 1 hour (3600 second) time limit per problem. All of the
instances were solved within the time limit. The statistics are tabulated in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. The
leftmost column indicates the instance type. Under a given instance type, rows 1-3 correspond to
the results for formulations CMCLP1-3, respectively. The values are the aggregated results from
50 instances of each instance type. We report the CPU time used to solve the problem (Solution
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Table 2.2: Instance settings
Type jIj jSj jT j K B r
T1 88 10 10 4 4 300
T2 88 10 20 4 4 300
T3 88 20 10 4 4 200
T4 88 20 10 4 4 300
T5 88 20 10 4 4 400
T6 88 20 10 4 4 500
T7 88 20 10 1 5 300
T8 88 20 10 2 5 300
T9 88 20 10 3 5 300
T10 88 20 10 4 5 300
T11 88 20 10 5 5 300
T12 88 20 20 4 4 300
T13 88 20 20 4 4 400
T14 88 20 30 4 4 300
T15 88 30 10 4 4 300
T16 88 30 20 4 4 300
T17 88 30 30 4 4 300
T18 88 40 10 4 4 300
T19 88 40 20 4 4 300
T20 88 40 20 4 8 300
Time), number of simplex iterations (Simplex Iterations), and number of branch and bound nodes
evaluated (Node Evaluations). We compare the LP relaxation at the root node and the optimal MIP
solution and report the percent integrality gap (%LPGap) calculated as (zLP zMIP )zMIP . For each of
these performance measures, we report the minimum, maximum and average of the results.
We isolate the effects of the problem parameters and illustrate them in Figures 2.7 and 2.8
below. Comparing T1, T4, T15, T18 with T2, T12, T16, T19, and T4, T12, T14 with T15, T16,
T17, we see that an increase in the number of potential leader and follower facilities increases the
average solution time. Their cross comparison shows that at higher levels of the other parameter,
this increase is magnified. These comparisons are plotted in Figure 2.7. If we compare T7-T11 we
notice also that the number of follower facilities to open affects the solution effort. An increase in
the number of facilities multiplies the size of the instance and the solution time. Another important
41
2.6. COMPUTATIONAL STUDY
Table 2.3: Solution statistics: Comparison of formulations
Solution Time Simplex Iterations Node Evaluations %LPGap
Avg Min Max Avg Min Max Avg Min Max Avg Min Max
T1 1 0.41 0.04 2.10 728 0 5817 15 0 175 16.4 0.0 42.7
2 0.39 0.04 2.79 686 0 8723 10 0 145 15.5 0.0 40.2
3 0.39 0.04 1.44 778 0 5038 13 0 128 14.8 0.0 40.2
T2 1 2.94 0.19 38.58 4245 53 54582 90 0 908 38.6 11.9 77.3
2 1.82 0.15 11.98 2681 35 19697 28 0 158 37.2 11.7 75.1
3 1.96 0.24 9.24 2234 79 11724 42 0 208 35.0 7.2 70.8
T3 1 0.21 0.02 0.98 335 0 2106 6 0 58 9.6 0.0 32.9
2 0.22 0.02 0.98 316 0 1898 4 0 27 8.5 0.0 32.9
3 0.27 0.04 0.94 571 0 3461 14 0 116 7.8 0.0 32.9
T4 1 2.11 0.13 11.83 4589 254 25430 98 0 411 14.9 1.2 39.8
2 1.70 0.18 7.20 3757 120 25484 51 0 245 14.3 1.2 36.0
3 2.06 0.17 8.84 5522 175 35199 88 0 395 14.0 1.2 35.7
T5 1 17.15 0.25 103.52 30708 365 164064 369 0 1672 18.9 7.4 43.8
2 11.23 0.28 66.61 20083 357 109892 153 0 820 18.5 7.4 43.4
3 16.81 1.34 116.48 33436 2076 197455 288 5 1249 18.3 7.4 41.3
T6 1 70.90 4.86 349.41 99338 12259 544882 750 139 2264 20.7 7.3 40.2
2 45.61 6.72 268.24 62933 8514 373206 318 68 1351 20.4 7.3 40.1
3 62.64 8.74 316.26 97645 10874 502173 541 82 1901 20.1 7.3 40.1
T7 1 0.11 0.01 0.51 151 16 593 2 0 32 3.3 0.0 24.6
2 0.08 0.01 0.42 144 0 748 2 0 31 2.9 0.0 20.7
3 0.11 0.02 0.61 325 30 2183 8 0 92 3.3 0.0 23.1
T8 1 0.28 0.02 0.92 818 36 4416 26 0 153 7.6 0.0 17.6
2 0.27 0.03 1.20 618 0 3350 14 0 90 6.9 0.0 17.5
3 0.44 0.03 1.93 1276 0 4672 37 0 167 6.7 0.0 16.4
T9 1 0.74 0.06 3.75 2211 109 15442 61 0 539 10.9 0.2 36.9
2 0.67 0.06 2.57 1595 0 9383 27 0 146 10.3 0.2 35.9
3 0.94 0.08 3.04 2849 111 11079 57 0 213 9.9 0.2 33.0
T10 1 2.62 0.16 27.45 6888 170 70071 148 0 1086 12.8 3.8 33.5
2 1.76 0.14 9.81 4595 100 41966 70 0 627 12.3 3.8 33.2
3 2.28 0.15 7.92 6507 238 29673 121 0 562 12.0 3.7 33.2
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Table 2.4: Solution statistics: Comparison of formulations (continued)
Solution Time Simplex Iterations Node Evaluations %LPGap
Avg Min Max Avg Min Max Avg Min Max Avg Min Max
T11 1 5.52 0.34 39.28 11986 473 71108 218 0 922 14.0 3.4 31.1
2 4.03 0.41 18.12 9045 601 37972 116 0 474 13.6 3.4 30.5
3 5.00 0.32 31.61 12758 666 78364 169 0 856 13.3 3.4 30.5
T12 1 18.90 0.73 82.16 31605 784 134944 539 3 2146 29.7 6.7 78.7
2 11.95 0.57 55.30 21889 849 118361 217 0 1327 29.0 6.7 78.7
3 11.52 1.15 61.31 24085 1654 131407 347 8 2591 28.5 6.7 78.6
T13 1 201.72 12.33 706.81 212994 11668 663059 1789 180 5911 32.6 12.5 68.2
2 128.74 12.87 501.36 144339 10525 643126 682 57 3570 31.9 12.5 66.8
3 117.99 9.78 431.41 175111 16026 648300 1255 156 3670 31.9 12.5 67.4
T14 1 50.32 1.42 284.75 63508 2475 386579 848 9 4019 39.6 10.4 74.0
2 37.24 1.99 210.87 51574 3678 254825 368 27 1445 39.0 10.3 73.6
3 24.54 1.46 119.57 41508 1880 150910 585 16 2168 38.0 10.3 68.3
T15 1 4.62 0.13 54.46 11152 211 129107 199 0 1489 13.3 3.2 27.8
2 3.59 0.14 47.80 8963 221 108045 113 0 905 12.9 2.8 27.8
3 5.88 0.40 45.21 15202 815 112504 205 0 1141 12.7 0.1 27.8
T16 1 69.10 0.94 640.31 100937 1408 596622 1354 31 8284 26.9 11.4 61.5
2 50.90 1.01 557.96 81098 1540 655455 660 32 3361 26.3 11.4 59.9
3 39.43 1.43 123.70 74529 2299 216763 909 60 3277 25.8 11.4 59.6
T17 1 160.04 10.32 725.09 180034 11939 655482 1913 150 6987 30.5 11.4 73.3
2 139.64 8.83 522.29 150563 10405 528393 948 74 2979 30.1 11.4 72.0
3 92.12 6.91 283.64 132119 8455 395635 1385 97 5053 29.6 11.3 72.7
T18 1 8.61 0.30 41.63 22097 475 85834 413 0 1432 13.6 3.2 40.0
2 6.35 0.43 32.43 16636 600 91117 239 0 1494 13.3 3.2 38.2
3 15.60 0.82 63.65 35319 982 140768 452 7 1729 13.2 3.2 35.7
T19 1 71.52 0.52 250.49 112918 754 420088 1449 0 6047 23.8 1.0 53.6
2 61.64 0.53 217.65 101998 657 374626 842 0 3090 23.4 1.0 53.6
3 68.78 0.61 194.02 112543 920 357041 1181 0 3689 23.1 1.0 53.6
T20 1 206.50 5.45 946.11 373380 13710 1694477 4717 265 31368 14.2 3.1 25.6
2 168.39 4.46 1012.34 316145 10061 2032369 2868 129 17995 14.0 3.0 25.6
3 250.67 15.20 1268.38 489369 21078 2691435 5578 339 35269 13.9 3.0 25.6
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factor is the coverage radius of the facilities. Although not a model parameter, it is the main factor
in determining the coverage relationship. Increasing the radius increases the number of covering
facilities, thus supply alternatives, for each customer. This generates a denser graph and the problem
size increases, as comparing T3-T6 shows. The effects of the number of follower facilities and the
coverage radius are plotted in Figure 2.8.
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Figure 2.7: Effect of number of potential locations on solution times
One final factor is the number of leader facilities to open (i.e., budget). An increase in the budget
does not increase the size of the instance but increases the number of possible facility combinations
for the leader, increasing the feasible solution space. A comparison between T19 and T20 demon-
strates this effect. When the budget is increased from 4 to 8, average solution time increases 3.1
times.
The same comparisons, when made for the %LPGap column, reveal different results. Increasing
the number of follower facilities to open or the coverage radius increases the gap. However, when
we increase the number of potential leader facilities and the investment budget, we see that the gap
decreases. Comparing T1, T4, T15 and T18; and T2, T12, T16 and T19, we see that the LP gap
decreases as jSj increases. Similarly, comparing T4 and T10, and T19 and T20, we see that an
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Figure 2.8: Effects of the number of greedy iterations and coverage radius on solution times
increase in budget decreases the gap. These are also expected as the former would make it possible
to have more good locations and the latter would make it possible to select more facilities from the
same set, keeping the opponent’s response capacity the same. The results for the number of follower
facilities have a opposite effect, as gap increases with increasing number of facilities.
The tables and the accompanying figures above provide a comparison among instance types,
which represent different difficulty levels. The cumulative histograms below illustrate the solution
performance of each formulation over all instances. Figure 2.9a shows that around 75% of the
instances were solved in under 30 seconds. The performance of the three formulations are close
but begin to differ as more difficult instances appear. Then, CMCLP2 and 3 dominate CMCLP1.
Interestingly, CMCLP2 performs the best for instances that were solved in 2 minutes, and after that
CMCLP3 takes over. Figure 2.9b indicates that about 65% of the instances had an LP gap of less
than 20% and about 2% of the instances had no integrality gap. It also shows that the tightness of
the formulations increases from CMCLP1 to 3, which is observable on Tables 2.3 and 2.4 as well.
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Figure 2.9: Comparison of three formulations
2.6.3 Solution Quality
Replacing the follower’s optimization problem with the greedy add algorithm leaves us with poten-
tially suboptimal solutions for the leader’s problem. In general, the model is expected to perform
well if the greedy add algorithm performs well for the restructured MCLP problem of the follower.
By restructuring, we refer to the loss of coverage over previously covered customers as some cus-
tomers would prefer open leader facilities. We would like to see how meaningful the solutions of
the model are. To do so, we perform the following two procedures.
First, upon solving Problem 4, we fix the leader’s open facilities. Then we restructure the
follower’s coverage relations and solve to optimality for the follower’s problem alone. This yields
the best response of the follower to the decision that the leader makes solving Problem 4. The
best response is important because we expect that this would be the follower’s true response, and
the customers that the follower serves in the solution of this problem would be the ones that the
follower actually would serve. Finally, we find the customers that are covered by the leader’s open
facilities but are not served by the follower in the subsequent solution and obtain the expected
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captured demand for the leader. We then compare this expected result with the suggested result of
Problem 4 which yields the “error” in the leader’s objective by assuming a greedy follower response.
A zero error indicates that the suggested and expected objectives are the same.
Next, we solve the modified model and obtain an upper bound on the leader’s optimal capture.
Then we compare it again with the expected captured demand of the leader. Note that we solve
Problem 4 to obtain the leader’s strategy, but solve the modified model to obtain an upper bound
only. This comparison yields the “optimality gap” of the leader. If this gap is zero, then the model
has found the overall optimal solution. The error and the optimality gap is calculated using the
formulas below, where superscriptM denotes the modified model results.
% Error =
jLC(LG; FG(LG))  LC(LG; F (LG))j
LC(LG; FG(LG))
% Optimality Gap =
LC(LM ; FM (LM ))  LC(LG; F (LG))
LC(LG; F (LG))
In Tables 2.5–2.6 we summarize the error and optimality gap results for each of the 20 instance
types. Table 2.5 is organized as follows. “Avg jErrorj (%)” shows the average error (in absolute
value) between the suggested and expected objectives and “Max jErrorj (%)” shows the maximum
of these errors, both as a percentage of the suggested objective. “% Correct” shows in what percent
of the results the model objective was correct. The experiments show that for these instances the
model performed quite well, the returned objective was at least 74 percent of the time correct and
93.4 percent on the average. The maximum percent error was 15.84 percent, whereas on average
the percent error was 0.28 percent.
Table 2.6 is organized similarly. “Avg Opt Gap (%)” shows the average optimality gap and “Max
jErrorj (%)” shows the maximum of these gaps, both as a percentage of the suggested objective as
a percentage of the suggested objective. The last column, “% Optimum,” shows what percent of
the instances were solved to optimality by the model. On the average, the optimality gap was
0.51 percent whereas the maximum optimality gap was 18.81 percent. Overall, 87.5 percent of all
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Table 2.5: Solution quality: Leader’s error in the objective
Type Avg jErrorj (%) Max jErrorj (%) % Correct
T1 0.19 9.38 98
T2 0.55 14.0 92
T3 0.00 0.0 100
T4 0.01 0.30 98
T5 0.15 5.19 94
T6 0.44 6.53 88
T7 0.00 0.0 100
T8 0.00 0.0 100
T9 0.01 0.28 98
T10 0.13 4.19 94
T11 0.23 6.11 92
T12 0.10 5.24 98
T13 1.56 13.80 74
T14 0.76 15.84 92
T15 0.13 6.37 98
T16 0.22 7.43 94
T17 0.25 8.36 94
T18 0.21 3.83 88
T19 0.46 7.33 86
T20 0.28 5.88 90
Summary 0.28 15.84 93.4
instances were solved to optimality.
In light of Table 2.2, we see that the performance deteriorates with increasing numbers of leader
and follower facilities, coverage radius, and number of greedy iterations. The performance, on the
other hand, is enhanced by an increasing investment budget of the leader. Note that when K = 1,
the error as well as the optimality gap is always 0 as the follower responds optimally. Figure 2.10
shows a joint histogram of error and optimality gap. This result does not differ between alternative
formulations. All models give the same result since the generated instances have all transitive
consumer choices (shortest distance).
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Table 2.6: Solution quality: Leader’s optimality gap
Type Avg Opt Gap (%) Max Opt Gap (%) % Optimum
T1 0.28 10.34 94
T2 1.04 18.26 86
T3 0.00 0.0 100
T4 0.02 0.68 96
T5 0.31 5.47 88
T6 0.65 8.16 80
T7 0.00 0.0 100
T8 0.00 0.0 100
T9 0.04 1.77 96
T10 0.13 4.37 94
T11 0.28 6.50 88
T12 0.58 10.10 88
T13 2.61 17.70 58
T14 1.28 18.81 82
T15 0.28 13.32 96
T16 0.48 8.2 84
T17 0.55 12.37 90
T18 0.21 2.41 80
T19 0.98 10.50 74
T20 0.56 6.45 76
Summary 0.51 18.81 87.5
2.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we introduced a mathematical model in order to devise a strategy for the leader
firm in a leader–follower version of the maximal covering problem. Our primary contribution is to
embed the follower’s response into the constraints of the leader’s optimization problem so that the
leader’s problem is reduced from a bilevel program to a single-level one. This keeps the leader’s
problem tractable and the problem size at a manageable level. Our model of the follower employs
the greedy add algorithm rather than solving his problem exactly, but we demonstrate that this
assumption comes at the expense of very little loss of accuracy.
Our computational study demonstrates that the model is able to:
 Generate near optimal (often optimal) solutions for the leader
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Figure 2.10: Histogram of objective error and optimality gap
 Provide a reasonable assessment of the follower’s response that can be embedded into the
leader’s optimization model.
Our numerical studies also indicated that the model size and the solution effort increase quickly
with increasing problem components—potential sites, customers and number facilities to open. One
interesting avenue for future research would be the introduction of demand uncertainty, but the
resulting scenarios would further increase the computational burden. Therefore investigation of
solution methods that do not require MIP solvers such as Lagrangian relaxation and decomposition
(e.g., Benders) based approaches is in our future research agenda.
Finally, the problem was stated with the most common features for competitive location prob-
lems. Variants of the problem with different patronizing rules and competition over potential loca-
tions (i.e. from a single set of potential locations) as well as customers would be important to study.
It would also be worthwhile to study the applicability of other simple algorithms as proxies for the
follower’s response.
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Chapter 3
A Competitive Network Design Problem
3.1 Introduction
Networks exist everywhere. Power networks transmit the electricity for our lighting and home
appliances. Telecommunication networks enable us to communicate regardless of the distances.
Production and distribution networks make the goods we need available. The efficiency of these
networks is crucial for us; therefore, the design of these networks has been a fundamental area in
operations research. Earlier studies about network design have a centralized point of view which
aims to find the optimal design from a single designer’s perspective.
However, networks are often formed without a central decision maker. The decentralized deci-
sion arising from competition among decision makers leads to network structures that have differ-
ent structures and deviate in reliability, cost, etc. compared to the central (i.e., optimal) solutions.
Studying competitively formed network structures has two objectives. A stakeholder (such as a local
government) can devise incentives to let decision makers voluntarily align their decisions with her
desired design. A competitor can develop design strategies that take rivals’ responses into account.
In this study, we introduce the network design game played on a graph G(N;E) with nodes N
and edges E, respectively, by independent decision makers —players— p 2 P . Players are located
at some nodes of this graph. Each node has a revenue potential and players connect these nodes
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to their origins by building arcs, which is costly. Each player, thus, wants to maximize her profit,
which is the net of earned revenue minus investment costs. Each individual player’s problem is a
special type of the Prize-Collecting Steiner Tree problem (PCST).
First, we consider a simultaneous-move setting and characterize the equilibrium actions of the
players. We propose a mixed integer programming (MIP) formulation that finds a pure strategy
Nash-equilibrium. Then, we discuss a Stackelberg version among two players. This problem is a
bilevel integer programming problem and we propose a heuristic reformulation of the lower level
(i.e., follower, second mover) problem that allows us to solve the problem as a single-level MIP
providing near optimal design strategies for the leader in the game. Furthermore, this reformulation
strategy is immediately applicable to other bilevel problems, whose second-level problems can be
posed as a prize-collecting Steiner tree problem.
We start with a brief review of key studies and concepts regarding competitive formation of
networks in Section 3.2.1. Then, we introduce the problem in Section 3.2.2, along with a review
of studies. In Section 3.4 we introduce the mathematical models for the noncompetitive case (i.e.,
single-player, central decision maker). Then, in Section 3.4 we introduce the two models we devel-
oped for the competitive case, respectively, for a simultaneous-move game and a sequential game.
Section 3.6 provides our computational study on the models and Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
3.2.1 Competitive Network Formation
Network formation has been comprehensively studied from the game theory perspective. The moti-
vation came mostly from the study of social networks and the formation of economic relationships
between firms/countries. Some of the earliest works that define a simple model for competitive net-
work formation are Aumann and Myerson (1988) and Myerson (1977) (also see (Myerson, 1991)).
Authors define an extensive form and a simultaneous move form for the network creation game,
where the nodes are the players and they wish to build arcs to other players. The idea being the
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same, the assumed arc type, payment structure and objective functions of the players lead to a wide
range of games. For instance Fabrikant et al. (2003) and Albers et al. (2006) study the network
connection game in which each node is a player and each player picks a subset of the other players
to build arcs to. The arcs are undirected, they are paid for by the builder and once built they can
be used by everyone. Each player minimizes the cost of building arcs and the total distance to all
other players. This approach is quite meaningful in explaining the spread of networks like the in-
ternet where cost and proximity is of value. Halevi and Mansour (2007) study the same network
but only consider the building cost and proximity to a subset of players which are named as friends,
hence bring the emphasis on a neighborhood of players for each player. Piliouras and Vigfusson
(2009) extend the idea where there is no connectivity requirement but there is an associated penalty
for unreachable nodes. Some interesting examples of similar games like free-trade treaties, market
sharing and academic cooperation (co-authoring) are introduced by Jackson (2003), who provides
a comprehensive survey of network creation models.
Connection games are the most basic of these games. A more sophisticated game is the path
player game (Puerto et al., 2008). In this game setting, the paths in a given network are players and
they wish to maximize the flow through them. Although this is not a network creation game, it is
important as it replaces the node player with a path player, which might be more appropriate to rep-
resent (with a complexity trade-off) the service providers such as railroads. A direct generalization
of this is a sub-network player of a given network wishing to maximize the flow through it. 3PL’s
and passenger transportation firms are examples. The non-cooperative tree creation game (Hoefer,
2006) is an extension of the connection game where players are nodes and they wish to connect
themselves to their terminal(s) forming a tree. Finally, spanning tree games (Gourve´s and Monnot,
2008) are another type of sophisticated network formation games where a set of nodes are given, of
which one is designated as a root node. The remaining nodes are players and they decide on their
parent node (thus create a link to it) to ultimately connect themselves to the root node. Variations
consider reliability (max), cost (min) and flow (bottleneck) objectives.
The model we suggest resembles spanning tree games the most. However, in our game, the root
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nodes are the players (so there are multiple root nodes) and the remaining nodes, even in the final
network, are not necessarily spanned due to the investment budget. Even if the investment budget is
infinite, the resulting network need not be a spanning tree. We explain our game in the next section.
In network formation games, two values are of significant importance. The first one is the price
of anarchy, introduced by Papadimitriou (2001), which is the ratio of the optimal (centralized) net-
work and the worst case Nash-equilibrium. This ratio, assuming that the game will end at some
Nash-equilibrium, gives the worst case deviation from the optimal result, and thus points out the
maximal cost of strategic behavior. On the other hand, as multiple Nash-equilibria are quite com-
mon, the price of stability (Anshelevich et al., 2004) refers to the ratio where the most likely —
presumably the most profitable — Nash-equilibrium is considered instead of the worst case, reflect-
ing the minimal cost of strategic behavior. Perakis and Roels (2007) studies the price of anarchy
in supply chains under different given network topologies and contracting schemes. Since the net-
works are given, there exists no network creation addressed in it.
These values provide metrics to evaluate the quality of the networks formed. The study of
improving the network quality (profitability, reliability) is a recent step taken in studying network
formation games. Creating better networks and mechanisms to induce such network formation will
also be an important part of our study. For instance, for certain games the resulting network need
not be connected. Brandes et al. (2008) study games where disconnected network formation is not
prohibited but penalized. Anshelevich et al. (2003) discuss near optimal network design maintaining
competition. Chen et al. (2008) and Christodoulou et al. (2009) discuss coordination mechanisms
and cost sharing in cooperative games, respectively.
3.2.2 Prize-collecting Steiner Tree
The Steiner tree problem is one of the most well-known problems in combinatorial optimization.
Given a set of nodes, a Steiner tree is the graph that connects these vertices at minimum cost. It is
also defined on an undirected graph G(N;E) with associated weights for the edges E. A minimum
weight connected subgraph that includes a given subset S of nodesN is sought. This is an NP-Hard
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problem; in fact, its decision problem is one of the original 21 NP-Complete problems of Karp
(1972). For a general discussion of this problem, readers may refer to the reviews by Cieslik (1998)
and Hwang et al. (1992).
The problem we consider is a variant of the Steiner tree problem. In the “prize-collecting”
case, revenues are associated with the nodes of the graph and the node inclusion requirement is
dropped. The problem is introduced by Segev (1987) with the name node-weighted Steiner tree
problem. Segev studied a variant where the node inclusion requirement is dropped for all but one
node (origin, root) and provided MIP formulations. This is the problem variant we are studying and
we will refer to these formulations in the subsequent discussion. We are going to refer to the rooted
variant as PCST, as well.
Bienstock et al. (1993) introduced the name PCST and a 3-approximation (guaranteeing an
objective within 3 times the optimum) for it. Goemans and Williamson (1995) pose the problem as
an equivalent minimization problem, where the sum of the costs of built edges and the revenue of
unselected nodes is minimized. They propose a (2   1jN j 1)-approximation (for the rooted variant
we study) that runs in O(jN j2 log jN j) time. Johnson et al. (2000) proposed an alteration over this
— a subroutine called strong pruning —which we will also use in our formulations. An algorithm
with a better approximation ratio (2   2jN j) and running time (O(jN j2 log jN j)) for the original
prize-collecting problem is proposed by Feofiloff et al. (2007). For polyhedral studies regarding
these problems readers may refer to Fischetti (1991) and Goemans (1994).
Some solution approaches other than Segev’s work are as follows. Engevall et al. (1998) pro-
pose an integer programming formulation and a Lagrangian relaxation algorithm. Lucena and Re-
sende (2004) propose a cutting-plane algorithm. Ljubic´ et al. (2006) implemented a branch-and-cut
algorithm bringing together several earlier methods. Recently, Haouari et al. (2008) report on La-
grangian relaxation using several subgradient strategies.
Finally, the problem has some immediate extensions such as imposing a quota (a lower limit on
collected revenue) or a budget (an upper bound on incurred costs). We do not consider them in this
study. Hereafter, we refer to the rooted variant of the prize-collecting Steiner tree problem that we
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study as PCST. In the next section, we are going to introduce how to incorporate competition into
the PCST.
3.3 The Problem
Let G(N;E) be an undirected graph with associated potential revenues ri for each node i 2 N and
costs ci;j for each edge (i; j) 2 E. There are P players. Each player p is initially located at her
individual origin node op 2 O  N and selects a subset of edges forming a connected subgraph
that includes the initial location of the player. These parameters are the same for each player. The
strategy set of a player is denoted as Sp = fGp(Np; Ep) : Gp is connected; Ep  E;Np  N; op 2
Npg. A strategy can also be equivalently formulated as the set of edges Ep selected by player p as
edges would imply inclusion of the end nodes.
We consider a non-cooperative game setting in which each player is going to pay the full cost
of the arc that it builds, yet the potential revenue is shared among players who build an arc to that
node. For simplicity, we consider equal sharing of potential revenue, but other sharing rules can be
incorporated into the models we are going to introduce. The players maximize their profits, which is
the net of total earned revenue minus the construction cost of the individual network. Consequently,
a Nash-equilibrium is defined as a result of the above game from which no individual player is
willing to unilaterally deviate, hence find a better feasible solution (with higher profit) by only
altering her own decision.
Before proceeding with the model, we briefly discuss the equilibria, central solution and prefer-
able network structures. Consider Figure 3.1 which illustrates a network with 5 nodes and 6 arcs
and associated potential node revenues and edge costs. Players 1 and 2 are respectively located at
nodes 1 and 5. In Figure 3.1a, the centralized solution (shown with bold edges) consists of the edges
f(1,2), (1,3), (5,4)g and has a profit of 18. In this case, when the two (non-cooperative) players make
their decisions simultaneously, the equilibrium would be identical to the centralized solution. This
is an ideal situation where competition does not cause inefficiency.
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Figure 3.1: An example game
However, this solution is an unconnected network. Connectivity could be an important criterion
for the reliability of the network. For instance, if this was a power network, connectivity could
serve as a protection against generation failure at nodes 1 or 5. For a third party (e.g., government
regulatory authority) that is interested in the connectivity of the network, this property has value.
Therefore, this investigation can yield information for third parties in shaping their incentive poli-
cies. For instance, introducing a 2 unit penalty for unconnected networks the competitive solution
moves towards connected networks introducing either of f(5,2), (5,3), (1,4)g to the equilibrium/op-
timal solution.
The identical result above cannot be obtained for all revenue/cost settings. Figure 3.1b illustrates
a different example. The optimal network is f(1,2), (5,2), (5,4)g, yielding a profit of 17. However,
when competition is brought into play, the equilibrium decisions are f(1,2), (1,3), (5,2)g (bold
edges) and one of f(1,4), (5,4)g (dashed edges). This not only illustrates a deviation from central
design, but also multiple equilibria. As a result, efficiency (i.e. profit) loss from competition does
not only exist but also change depending on the obtained equilibrium. Here, the equilibria including
(5,4) and (1,4) exemplify the worst and best equilibria, respectively, thus indicate price of anarchy
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of 1712 = 1:42 and price of stability of
17
13 = 1:31. On the other hand the resulting network is
connected compared to the unconnected optimal network, which does not require any incentives,
unlike the other. As a final remark, it is possible that the firms cooperate in the design process. For
instance, a contract, in which player 2 pays player 1 a sum of 2 units in exchange for not building
arc (1,2), will result in an improved competitive solution. In the models below, however, we do not
consider cooperation between players.
3.4 MIP Models for the Noncompetitive Problem
3.4.1 Individual Player
When we disregard competition, the problem of a given player is a Prize-Collecting Steiner Tree
(PCST) problem. There are a few variants of this problem. Here, we consider the profit maximiza-
tion variant. Given an undirected graph G(N;E) with associated a nonnegative cost for each edge
and a nonnegative revenue for each node, a player p selects (builds) a connected subgraph G(N;E)
that maximizes the net of collected revenues minus the incurred costs. The only restriction other
than the connectivity requirement is that the player’s origin node op should be in the built subgraph.
For the sake of formulation, we replace the undirected graph with the equivalent directed graph
G(N;A) that has arcs (i; j) 2 A and (j; i) 2 A with symmetric cost parameters. We do not con-
sider origin nodes as occupiable, hence let ri = 0 for i 2 O and let N 0 = N  O be the nodes that
are occupiable, A0 = (i; j) 2 A such that i 2 N 0 [ op and j 2 N 0 be the arcs that are selectable.
Indices:
i; j; k 2 N : Vertices, nodes
p 2 P : Players
op 2 O  N : Origin node of player p
Parameters:
cij : Cost of building arc (i; j), cij = cji > 0
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rj : Potential revenue of node j, rj  0
M : A sufficiently large positive number (better, arc specificMij)
Variables:
yij : If arc (i; j) is selected yij = 1 and 0 otherwise
fij : Flow through arc (i; j)
The optimal solution to this problem is a tree; more specifically, given the selected subset of nodes,
it is a minimum cost spanning tree (MCST) that spans only the selected nodes and is rooted at the
origin node of the player. Ensuring this, hence, avoiding cycles, is key in the formulation. We can
introduce subtour elimination constraints for that purpose. Instead, in Model 1, we prefer to use a
network flow formulation and eliminate cycles through flow balance equations. It is a modification
of Segev’s (1987) tree-type formulation. Basically, we assume that the flow only passes through
selected arcs and is reduced at the visited nodes by an amount that is equal to the revenue earned at
that node. The flow originates from the source node and is consumed at the selected nodes. This
resembles the approach of Miller, Tucker, and Zemlin (1960) for the traveling salesman problem.
Model 1 PCST Problem: Tree formulation
max
X
j2N 0
fop;j  
X
(i;j)2A0
cijyij (3.1)
s.t.
X
j2N 0[op
fji  
X
j2N 0
fij = ri
X
j2N 0
yji 8i 2 N 0 (3.2)
xij Myij 8(i; j) 2 A0 (3.3)X
i2N
yij  1 8j 2 N 0 (3.4)
fij  0 8(i; j) 2 A0
yij 2 f0; 1g 8(i; j) 2 A0
The objective (3.1) states that maximizing profit is equivalent to maximizing the net of total
flow originating from the source node minus the total fixed arc costs. Flow balance constraint (3.2)
requires that flow into a node is equal to the revenue of the node plus the flow out from the node.
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Constraint (3.3) states that a positive flow through an arc, implies a built arc. Constraint (3.4) ensures
that only one arc can enter a selected node. The resulting network is a tree, as directed cycles are
eliminated by (3.4) and undirected cycles by (3.2). Finally, the flow variables fij are nonnegative
and the arc selection variables yij are binary.
Model 1 is not very strong because of theM in (3.3). SettingM =
P
j2N 0 ri is sufficient, but
an immediate improvement to this is to assign separateMij for each arc. We can calculate them as
follows. Let SPj denote the shortest path from op to node j 2 N 0 on graph G(N;A) such that the
distance dij between two nodes is defined as the revenue of the destination node. That is, dij = rj .
Then, we setMij =
P
j2N 0  SPi.
This modification helps, but we can come up with a tighter formulation, eliminating M com-
pletely. As mentioned earlier, whenever we select a set of nodes, the arcs to be selected is just
a MCST problem. Therefore, we can also model PCST as a node selection problem, where the
subsequent arc selection problem is modeled and solved as a linear program, for instance, using a
multi-commodity flow formulation. We can define a separate flow from the origin to each node with
positive revenue as if they were different commodities with unit demand at the destination nodes.
This would result in Model 2, which is the multi-commodity flow formulation in Segev (1987). We
are only interested in destinations with positive revenue, hence let N+ be the set of i 2 N 0 such
that ri > 0.
Variables:
xj : If node j is selected xj = 1 and 0 otherwise
fijk : Flow through arc (i; j) with destination k
The objective (3.5) is the total revenue from selected nodes with positive revenue minus the total
cost of selected arcs. Flow balance equations (3.6) ensure that for a selected (i.e. xk = 1) node a
unit flow is supplied by the origin, carried through intermediary nodes untouched and is consumed
at the destination node. Similarly, according to (3.7), positive flow implies a selected arc. Since the
flows are at most 1, we can setM = 1 and eliminate it from the formulation. Finally, flows fijk are
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nonnegative, and selection variables xj and yij are binary.
The best thing about this formulation is that it is very tight, often returning an integral solution
at the root node. The downside is, of course, the size of the instances it creates as it has about jN+j
times more variables and constraints than the previous model, which exhausts memory rapidly.
Despite this fact, we are going to use this formulation as the base for the coming models and related
computational experiments.
Model 2 PCST Problem: Multi-commodity formulation
max
X
k2N+
rkxk  
X
(i;j)2A0
cijyij (3.5)
s.t.
X
j2N 0[op
fjik  
X
j2N 0
fijk =
8<:
 xk if i = op
xk if i = k
0 otherwise
8i 2 N 0 [ op; k 2 N+ (3.6)
fijk  yij 8(i; j) 2 A0; k 2 N+ (3.7)
fijk  0 8(i; j) 2 A0; k 2 N+
xk 2 f0; 1g 8k 2 N+
yij 2 f0; 1g 8(i; j) 2 A0
3.4.2 Central Decision Maker
We can easily extend this model to include multiple origins (players) when there is a central decision
maker. Note that, with the inclusion of multiple origins the optimal subgraph becomes a forest with
trees rooted at the origins. We can overcome this by picking one of the origins, say op, and defining
dummy arcs, (op; op0 ), with 0 cost from this origin to all other origins. This turns the problem into
an instance of PCST with origin node op. We simply update updateA0 = A0[
S
p
02P (op; op0 ) in the
constraints. Note that this case is essentially the same as a single player with multiple origin nodes
(e.g., a company with multiple power plants); hence, the trick would work for that case, too.
61
3.5. MIP MODELS FOR THE COMPETITIVE PROBLEM
3.5 MIP Models for the Competitive Problem
As mentioned earlier, we are interested in the equilibrium solutions that are obtained under compe-
tition. We consider two game settings — simultaneous and sequential. The equilibria for simulta-
neous game can be found by mimicking the unilateral moves of each player on the jP j dimensional
matrix of player strategies until no utility-increasing (i.e., profit-increasing) move can be made by
the players. Each move is an instance of PCST, once the revenues are updated according to the last
occupancy information. This method, therefore, requires solving an indeterminate number of PCST
instances. Whether there exists such an equilibrium is also a question. Using our second model, we
show the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium and as we propose an MIP model that solves for
an equilibrium solution, returning a pure-strategy equilibrium for the players.
3.5.1 Simultaneous Game: Iterative Method
A simple way to find an equilibrium is to mimic the unilateral move of a player on the jP j dimen-
sional strategy matrix, given the rest of the players’ strategies. Algorithm 3.1 performs this. It solves
for a single player’s decision optimally at each (inner) iteration, and updates the revenue structure
accordingly. If two consecutive passes through all players (two consecutive outer iterations) gen-
erate the same network structure, then the algorithm terminates, returning an equilibrium solution.
Let Gp;t(Np;t; Ap;t) = fNp;t;Ap;tg be the graph built by player p at (outer) iteration t, ni;p be the
number of occupants other than p in node i at a given time, and r0i and c
0
i;j be the initial values of
the parameters for node revenue and arc cost.
3.5.2 Simultaneous Game: MIP Model
There are jP j players in the game that is played on the undirected graph G(N;E) (and the corre-
sponding directed graph G(V;A)). There are jAj = 2jEj items to select from for each player. A
decision made by player p on arc (i; j) is denoted with a decision variable yijp where y = 1 if the
arc is selected and 0 otherwise. Then the decision vector yp = (yijp : (i; j) 2 A) is called a strategy
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Algorithm 3.1 Iterative Method to Find Equilibria
let t = 0; r0i = ri; c
0
i;j = ci;j
let Gp;t(Np;t; Ap;t) = (op; ;) for all p 2 P
repeat
t t+ 1
for p = 1 to jP j do
compute ni;p for all i 2 N 0
ri  r
0
i
ni;p+1
for all i 2 N 0
solve PCST (p) with updated parameters.
Gp;t(Np;t; Ap;t) PCST (p)
end for
until Gp;t(Np;t; Ap;t) = Gp;t 1(Np;t 1; Ap;t 1) for all p 2 P
return Gp;t(Np;t; Ap;t) for each p 2 P as equilibrium solution
for player p 2 P . The number of strategies of a player is finite (in fact, 2jAj) and this strategy set
is the same for all players. However, the feasible strategy set is less as the arcs need to form a tree
and they are different for different players as the selection of the player’s origin node is mandatory
in building a feasible player network.
This model is based on the idea by Rosenthal (1973) who described a class of games which
possess pure strategy equilibria. Before introducing the mathematical model and going on with the
formal proof that this model finds an equilibrium solution, let us discuss the rationale and give some
examples. The model is quite similar to the earlier models in the definition of the feasible network
structure (i.e., tree). Since the optimal network built by each player is a tree, we are going to
eliminate non-tree solutions from players’ strategy sets. Each player selects a subset of arcs (similar
to primary factors in Rosenthal (1973)) and the head nodes pointed by these arcs. The revenue that
a player would expect to earn when she selects an arc (i; j) when node j is already occupied by
n  1 players is rjn and and she pays cij , yielding a marginal profit of
rj
n   cij . Recall that arc costs
are fully paid by the builder while the node revenues are shared equally. Remembering the iterative
procedure, this resembles how the decision is made by a player when her turn comes. The player
would build the most profitable tree given the number of occupants in, hence the updated revenue
of, each node. Roughly, our claim is that if we maximize the sum of this marginal profit — revenues
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over all nodes and number of players occupying them and costs over all selected arcs — and only
allow trees to be built by individual players, this would result in an equilibrium solution.
Let us revisit the example from Section 3.4. Considering Figure 3.1b would give us an idea of
how this method works. Two players — left and right — make their decisions on feasible strategy
sets f(1,2),(1,3),(1,4)g and f(5,2),(5,3),(5,4)g, respectively. Both of them select node 2 because
given whether the other selects, selecting node 2 still increases the sum— by 5 4 = 1 and 5 3 =
2, respectively — for both. If both players select node 3, then the sum would be 10+5 4 6 = 5.
If only left selects, 10   4 = 6 or only right selects, 10   6 = 4. Thus the sum of marginal profits
would be maximized if left player selects. We already know from our previous analysis of these
examples that these were the selected arcs in an equilibrium. However, we could select either of the
dashed arcs and each would be an equilibrium solution. This method would return an equilibrium
that selects (1; 4) because it has a higher marginal profit — 10 6 = 4 vs. 10 7 = 3—and sharing
would decrease — 10 + 5  6  7 = 2— the sum. As a result, the method promotes sharing when
profitable by both (or more) parties, and prefers lower cost (higher margin) alternatives otherwise.
We introduce the new additions and modifications to the notation below. Note the slight differ-
ence in the definitions of parameter r and variables x; y and f . Since the model includes all players,
we define A0 = (i; j) such that i 2 N and j 2 N 0.
Indices:
n 2 P : Number of occupants at a selected node (in the solution).
Parameters:
rjn : Revenue earned from node j by a player given that there are   1 occupants in the
node. rjn =
rj
n
Variables:
xkp : If player p selects node k, xkp = 1, and 0 otherwise
yijp : If player p selects arc (i; j), yijp = 1, and 0 otherwise
fijpk : Flow originating at op, passing through arc (i; j) with destination k
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tjn : Variable equals to 1 if n players occupy node j.
Model 3 Competitive PCST: Simultaneous Move Game
max
X
k2N+
X
n2P
rkntkn  
X
(i;j)2A0
X
p2P
cijyijp (3.8)
s.t.
X
j2N
fjipk  
X
j2N 0
fijpk =
8<:
 xkp if i = op
xkp if i = k
0 otherwise
i 2 N; p 2 P; k 2 N+ (3.9)
fijpk  yijp (i; j) 2 A0; k 2 N+ (3.10)X
p2P
xkp =
X
n2P
tkn k 2 N+ (3.11)
fijpk  0 (i; j) 2 A0; k 2 N+
yijp 2 f0; 1g (i; j) 2 A0
xkp 2 f0; 1g k 2 N+; p 2 P
tkn 2 f0; 1g k 2 N+; n 2 P
Objective (3.8) is the sum of all nodes’ marginal revenues over each possible number of occu-
pants (if none occupies the node, this is 0) minus the total cost of arcs built by all players. (3.9)
is the flow balance constraint at node i, for each destination node (i.e. commodity) k. If node i is
an origin node of player p it supplies a flow of xkp. If i = k, it consumes the flow xkp supplied
by player p. Otherwise, inflow equals outflow, netting 0. A positive flow through (i; j) with origin
op and destination k indicates that arc (i; j) is selected by player p. Constraint (3.11) ensures that
the number of occupants in nodes (with positive revenue) is accounted for correctly. The right hand
side is the number of occupants. Assume there are m occupants in the optimal solution. Since rkn
is decreasing in n and the problem is a maximization problem, we obtain tk;1 = : : : = tk;m = 1 and
tk;m+1 = : : : = tk;jP j = 0 at optimality. Finally, the flow variables are continuous and the arc/node
selection variables are binary.
The above problem is feasible (each player can simply select her source vertex as a feasible
strategy) and the number of feasible strategies is finite with finite profits, so the solution exists and is
bounded. The second question is whether this solution is an equilibrium or not. In order to qualify as
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an equilibrium, a solution should consist of best responses of the players given the others’ responses.
Thus for a player p, denoting her decision vector as yp and the corresponding individual profit given
other players’ decisions as p(y1; :::; yp; :::; yjP j), a solution (y1; :::; yp; :::; yjP j) is an equilibrium
solution if and only if p(y1; ; yp; ; yjP j)  p(y1; ; yp; ; yjP j) for all yp, for all p 2 f1; :::; jP jg.
Theorem 11. The optimal solution of Model 3 is a Nash equilibrium for the simultaneous-move
game.
Proof. By contradiction. Let’s assume that the solution is not an equilibrium solution, though it is
still optimal to the model. Then there should exist a player who would willingly and unilaterally
deviate from her current decision. The deviation is willing if the player would find a more profitable
alternative, and it is unilateral if that player would alter only her decision, while other players’
decisions are kept the same.
Thus, there exists a player p^ who drops some of her previously selected arcs and adds some
of her previously unselected arcs. Let () denote the optimal model solution and () denote the
solution obtained after p^ makes her decision. Let the set of dropped arcs be A0 = f(i; j) : yij;p^ =
1; yij;p^ = 0g and the set of added arcs be A1 = f(i; j) : yij;p^ = 0; yij;p^ = 1g. Consequently,
let the set of dropped head nodes be N0 = fj : (i; j) 2 A0g and the set of added head nodes be
N1 = fj : (i; j) 2 A1g.
Assume that in the solution, nj players occupy the node j, thus tj;1 =; : : : ; t

j;nj
= 1. If a player
drops arc (i; j), then tj;nj = y

ij;p^ = 0 so her profit decreases by rj;nj   cij . On the contrary, if she
adds arc (i; j), then tj;nj+1 = y

ij;p^ = 1 and her profit increases by rj;nj+1 cij . Since the alteration
is profitable,
X
(i;j)2A1
(rj;nj+1   cij) 
X
(i;j)2A0
(rj;nj   cij) =
X
j2N1
rj;nj+1  
X
(i;j)2A1
cij  
X
j2N0
rj;nj +
X
(i;j)2A0
cij > 0:
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These steps are summarized below.
z =
X
j2N 0
X
n2P
rjnt

jn  
X
(i;j)2A0
X
p2P
cijy

ijp
=
X
j2N 0
njX
n=1
rjnt

jn  
X
(i;j)2A0
X
p2P
cijy

ijp
<
X
j2N 0
njX
n=1
rjnt

jn  
X
(i;j)2A0
X
p2P
cijy

ijp +
24X
j2N1
rj;nj+1  
X
(i;j)2A1
cij
35 
24X
j2N0
rj;nj  
X
(i;j)2A0
cij
35
=
X
j2N 0
X
n2P
rjnt

jn  
X
(i;j)2A0
X
p2P
cijy

ijp
= z (3.12)
This contradicts our initial assumption that the solution was optimal (i.e., z  z), yet not an
equilibrium. Thus, every solution to this problem is an equilibrium as well.
Note that since the problem is always feasible and bounded and the solution is an equilibrium
solution, a pure strategy equilibrium for the simultaneous-move game exists.
Corollary 12. There exists a pure-strategy equilibrium for this game.
This model does not necessarily give the most or the least profitable equilibrium solution. We
can show this using the simple counterexample in Figures 3.2, which illustrates the graph and its
parameters, and 3.3, which illustrates the four possible equilibria on this graph. The equilibria in
Figures 3.4a–3.3d have objectives of 9, 8, 9, 10 but total profits of 4, 8, 9, 5, respectively. Therefore,
Figures 3.3c and 3.4a show the most and least profitable equilibria, while the model returns the
equilibria in Figure 3.3d.
Model 3 can be made smaller in size by a few modifications. We can redefine the variables f
and y and obtain the compact formulation as follows:
Variables:
fijk : Flow passing through arc (i; j) with destination k
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yij : Number of players that selected arc (i; j)
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Figure 3.2: A counterexample: Setting
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Figure 3.3: A counterexample: Equilibria
The two programs are almost alike, but now note that the flow through an arc can be larger than 1
and y is no longer binary.
Lemma 13. Models 3 and 4 return the same optimal solution and objective function value.
Proof. Assume that we solve both models optimally. Constraint (3.16) and variables t and x are
identical in both models. In constraint (3.14), flows fijk originate at individual origin nodes and are
consumed at destination nodes. Hence for each k the optimal network is a tree rooted at k. This
tree can be traced back to the origin nodes of the players who select k and the corresponding fijpk
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Model 4 Competitive PCST: Simultaneous Move Game, Compact
max
X
k2N+
X
n2P
rkntkn  
X
(i;j)2A0
cijyij (3.13)
s.t.
X
j2N
fjik  
X
j2N 0
fijk =
8<:
 xkp if i = opP
p2P xkp if i = k
0 otherwise
i 2 N; k 2 N+ (3.14)
fijk  yij (i; j) 2 A0; k 2 N+ (3.15)X
p2P
xkp =
X
n2P
tkn k 2 N+ (3.16)
fijk  0 (i; j) 2 A0; k 2 N+
yij  0 (i; j) 2 A0
xk;p 2 f0; 1g k 2 N+; p 2 P
tkn 2 f0; 1g k 2 N+; n 2 P
can be retrieved. In constraint (3.9), flows are already defined for each player, hence the optimal
network for each selected k and selecting p would be a path from op to k. The union of these paths
would indeed give the optimal tree enforced by (3.14) and we can retrieve fijk =
P
p fijpk.
Since constraint (3.10) returns if a given (i; j) is built by player p, we can obtain the number of
players building the arc by computing
P
p yijp. On the other hand, yij is not necessarily equal to
the number of players building arc (i; j) but is equal to that value at optimality. See Figure 3.4 for
an example.
Considering that we have a maximization problem, constraint (3.15) implies yij = maxk fijk =
maxkf
P
p fijpkg. Similarly, (3.10) implies yijp = maxk fijpk. Hence our claim is that, at optimal-
ity, maxkf
P
p fijpkg =
P
p(maxk fijpk). As already defined,
P
p(maxk fijpk) is the number of
players that use arc (i; j). And it is easy to show that
P
p(maxk fijpk)  maxkf
P
p fijpkg. For
maxkf
P
p fijpkg to correspond to the same value, there should be some k such that all distinct
players using arc (i; j) should select k.
For a contradiction, assume otherwise. Let k1 be the node that is selected by the largest number
of players that use arc (i; j) to send flow to it. Let the set of those players be P1, and note that
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Figure 3.4: A suboptimal solution:
P
p yijp = 3 > 2 = yij
jP1j = maxkf
P
p fijpkg. The claim is that P1 does not include all the players using arc (i; j). Then
there should be some destination node k2 and a corresponding set of players P2 who use arc (i; j)
to send flow to k2 such that P2 n P1 6= ;. Then there exist players p1 2 P1 n P2 and p2 2 P2 n P1.
In other words, fij;p1;k1 = 1, fij;p1;k2 = 0, fij;p2;k1 = 0 and fij;p2;k2 = 1. This result is feasible,
but is suboptimal as we can take the path from j to k2 that belongs to player p2 and give it to player
p1. By doing this we do not change the number of occupants at node k2, yet (potentially) prevent
p2 from building (i; j) which increases the objective. Therefore at optimality P2 n P1 = ; and
yij =
P
p yijp.
3.5.3 Stackelberg Game: MIP Model
Frequently, we are not just interested in finding an equilibrium solution to the game but we also
wish to assume the role of one of the players. There are different such game settings. Here, as in
Chapter 2, we consider the Stackelberg type competition, a game setting in which one of the players
has the chance to make the first move, thus is the leader (L) in the game, and the other player is her
follower (F ). Furthermore, we assume the role of the leader, and the role of the follower is simply
optimizing his own objective after the leader’s strategy is revealed. On the contrary, the leader has to
account for her opponent’s decision and has to optimize her objective expecting that the follower’s
objective (reaction) would be optimal given hers. This type of model (for two players) is referred
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to as bilevel programming in the mathematical programming literature. The integer programming
version is referred to as integer bilevel linear programming (IBLP).
Letting G(Np; Ep) denote the subgraphs built by players p 2 fL;Fg, a bilevel program for
the leader’s problem is sketched below in Model 5. The leader maximizes her profit (3.17), which
is dependent on the nodes she and the follower select and arcs she builds. The resulting network
should be a connected (3.19) subgraph of G(N;E), include leader origin oL but not follower origin
oF as (3.18) suggests. Moreover, the subset of nodes that the follower selects should solve the
optimization problem — the same problem from follower’s point of view — as in (3.20).
Model 5 Competitive PCST, Bilevel Program Sketch
max
NL;EL
revenue(NL; NF )  cost(EL) (3.17)
s.t. EL  E; NL  N; oL 2 NL; oF 62 NL (3.18)
G(NL; EL) is connected (3.19)
NF 2 arg max
NF ;EF
revenue(NF ; NL)  cost(EF )
s.t. EF  E; NF  N; oF 2 NF ; oL 62 NF
G(NF ; EF ) is connected
(3.20)
Solving the leader’s problem optimally for combinatorial optimization problems like PCST (as
follower’s problem) seems impractical using current algorithmic technology. Instead, we are going
to focus on developing a heuristic reformulation of the follower’s problem to obtain a reasonable
single-level MIP model for the leader’s problem. In Chapter 2, we used the greedy algorithm to
determine the follower’s response but kept his decision space intact. He could open any facility but
the facilities were picked using a heuristic that potentially yielded suboptimal solutions. Now, we
would like to look at the problem from a different perspective. We will restrict the decision space
of the follower, but are going to solve his optimization problem exactly over this restricted decision
space.
The idea is as follows. Given graph G(N;E), the follower’s decision space is restricted to a
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directed tree T (NT ; AT ) that is rooted at oF . It consists of nodes NT  N n oF and arcs AT  A
whose direction is from the root to the leaves. Then the optimization problem in (3.20) becomes
Model 6.
Model 6 Competitive PCST, Follower’s Restricted Response
max
NF ;AF
revenue(NF ; NL)  cost(AF ) (3.21)
s.t. AF  AT ; NF  NT ; oF 2 NF (3.22)
G(NF ; AF ) is connected (3.23)
The good thing about Model 6 is that we can solve this problem optimally using a heuristic that
runs in O(jT j) (with given ordering) time. Next, we will describe the heuristic and show that it
finds the optimal solution. Then, we will describe a feasibility problem— a set of linear constraints
without an objective function and show that this problem is equivalent to the heuristic and hence to
Model 6.
The heuristic (see Algorithm 3.2) relies on the observation that the optimal PCST does not have
any unprofitable subtrees. That is, starting with the origin and continuing through children, every
subtree is profitable. The heuristic is modified from the strong pruning algorithm by Johnson et al.
(2000), who devised it as an improvement step for the primal-dual algorithm for PCST proposed in
Goemans and Williamson (1995). Recall that T is defined to be rooted at oF . We also define the
subtree of T rooted at i 2 NT as Ti. Hence T = ToF . Furthermore, let S denote the candidate
solution with current knowledge and R denote the currently unchecked portion of T . Both S and R
will be initialized as T and are going to stay as trees throughout the iterations. Finally, let Si be the
subtree of S which is rooted at i and di be the profit from adding it.
The algorithm proceeds as follows. At each iteration, a leaf i of the remaining treeR is checked.
If it is profitable to select Si [ (parent(i); i), S remains intact and the profit is carried to the parent
of i. Otherwise, the entire Si [ (parent(i); i) is pruned from S. At the end of the iteration node i
and arc (parent(i); i) is removed fromR, hence will not be considered in the subsequent iterations.
See Figure 3.5 for an example
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Figure 3.5: Strong pruning
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Algorithm 3.2 Strong Pruning for Follower Problem
given leader solution xLi for each i 2 NT
update revenue: let ri  (1  0:5xLi )ri
let S = T (NT ; AT ), R = T (NT ; AT ), and di = 0 for all i 2 NT
while R 6= oF do
let i be a leaf of R
let di = maxfdi + ri   cparent(i);i; 0g
if di > 0 then
let dparent(i) = dparent(i) + di
else
remove Si and arc (parent(i); i) from S
end if
remove node i and arc (parent(i); i) from R
end while
return S as optimal PCST on T and with objective doF
Before showing that the algorithm returns the optimal PCST on a tree, let us discuss some
properties of this restricted problem. First, consider T (N;A) rooted at some node o. Since each
node i 2 N no has a single arc (parent(i); i) entering it, selecting the node is equivalent to selecting
the entering arc. Consider a subtree Ti of T . The profit of selecting any subset N
0
from the nodes
in Ti is
P
j2N 0(rj   cparent(j);j), hence the optimal solution for Ti is independent of the decisions
made for any j 62 Ti. However, a feasible solution for the overall problem should be connected to
the root node. Therefore, if parent(i) or any node on the path from o to i is not selected, entire Ti
would not be selected, either.
Theorem 14. Algorithm 3.2 solves the PCST on a tree optimally.
Proof. By induction on i from leaves to root. We start with the leaves of T . Let i be a leaf of T , so
i has no children. Then, if ri  cparent(i);i > 0, hence adding node i is profitable, we carry the profit
to the parent. Because if the parent of i is selected, it will be profitable to select i, too. If not, we
remove i from further consideration. Any feasible solution that selects i can simply be improved
by not selecting it it. At the end of the iteration Si is either i or empty. This is exactly what the
algorithm does for the leaves of T .
Assume we find the optimal solution for all the children j of a given node i. It is easy to see
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that the algorithm goes through all the children before considering a parent. Optimal solutions Sj
are assumed to be found, so associated profits dj are already carried to the parent from profitable
children. The optimal decisions for the subtrees rooted at the children of i are independent of the
decision for i as mentioned before. di + ri   cparent(i);i equals the profit of selecting node i and all
the optimal solutions of the children. Currently, Si = i
S
j(Sj [ (i; j)). If the profit is positive, we
select i and the optimal solutions of the children, hence Si remains untouched. Otherwise, for any
feasible solution that selects i, we can come up with a better solution that does not select i, hence
Si = ; after the removal.
Letting i be the origin, we obtain the optimal solution S.
Now, we represent this algorithm as a set of linear constraints. The leader’s decision variables
are the same in Model 2. We add the superscript L [F ] to x in order to distinguish the leader
[follower]. We also define three new variables to represent the strong pruning algorithm in the
model.
Variables:
xLj : If leader selects node j, x
L
j = 1 and 0 otherwise
yij : If leader selects arc (i; j), yij = 1 and 0 otherwise
fijk : Leader’s flow through arc (i; j) with destination k
xFj : If follower selects node j, x
F
j = 1 and 0 otherwise
di : (Potential) follower profit transferred from node i to parent of i
ui : (Actual) follower profit transferred from parent of i to node i
wi : If both players select node i, wi = 1 = xLj x
F
j and 0 otherwise
The potential profit flows “downward” from the leaves to the root node as in Figure 3.6a. At each
evaluated node i potential profit di is calculated as in (3.24). It is the maximum of 0 and the sum of
the potential profit from the children plus its own profit. Note also that d is nonnegative.
di 
X
j:(i;j)2T
dj + ri(1  0:5xLi )  cparent(i);i8i 2 T (3.24)
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Figure 3.6: Two way profit flow
(3.24) imposes no upper bound on the value of doL . We would like to balance this with a reverse,
hence “upward,” flow from the root node to the leaves as in Figure 3.6b, which would eventually be
equal to the actual profit. (3.25) says that the actual profit would be equal to the potential profit at
the root node, but it would be less than the potential profit everywhere else. If i is selected, profit ui
is reduced by the i’s own profit and is passed to its children conditional on that the parent is selected
(3.26).
ui
8><>: = di if i = oF di otherwise 8i 2 T (3.25)
ui =
X
j:(i;j)2T
uj + ri(x
F
i   0:5wi)  cparent(i);ixFi 8i 2 T (3.26)
Since a feasible solution needs to be a tree with root oF , if a node is selected, its parent should also
be selected (3.27).
xFj  xFi 8(i; j) 2 T (3.27)
Note that wi = xLi x
F
i and (3.28) linearizes this constraint.
wi
8>>>><>>>>:
 xLi
 xFi
 xLi + xFi   1
8i 2 T (3.28)
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Finally, the flows u and d are nonnegative and selection variables xF and w are binary.
Model 7 Competitive PCST, Stackelberg Game
max
X
k2N+
rk(x
L
k   0:5wk) 
X
(i;j)2A0
cijyij (3.29)
s.t. Leader’s decision: (3.30)
X
j2N 0[op
fjik  
X
j2N 0
fijk =
8<:
 xLk if i = op
xLk if i = k
0 otherwise
8i 2 N 0 [ op; k 2 N+ (3.31)
fijk  yij 8(i; j) 2 A0; k 2 N+ (3.32)
Follower’s response:
Constraints (3.24), (3.25), (3.26), (3.27), (3.28)
fijk  0 8(i; j) 2 A0; k 2 N+
xLk 2 f0; 1g 8k 2 N+
yij 2 f0; 1g 8(i; j) 2 A0
ui; di  0 8i 2 T
xFk ; wi 2 f0; 1g 8i 2 T
Theorem 15. Constraints (3.24), (3.25), (3.26), (3.27), (3.28) are equivalent to strong pruning.
Proof. Each selectable node has only one parent and we can treat revenue as a parameter after
accounting for the leader decision. Therefore, to ease the notation, let ci and ri be used instead of
cparent(i);i and ri(1  0:5xLi ), respectively.
Nonnegativity d  0 and (3.24) implies di  maxfdi+ri ci; 0g. Therefore, di  di for all i 2
T , where () denotes the strong pruning (i.e., optimal) result. By definition, ui =
P
i2Ti(ri ci)xFi ,
where Ti is the subtree rooted at node i. As xFi  xFj for all j 2 Ti, we have
xFi = 0) ui = 08i 2 T (3.33)
Now, consider a subtree Ti. Potential profit di is always nonnegative, hence we have the following
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two cases:
Case 1: Let di > 0 and the children of i be j 2 J . Assume di = ui, if ri 6= ci, then xFi = 1.
Recall that uj  dj , for all j, so we obtain
X
j2J
uj = ui   (ri   ci)xFi = di   ri + ci 
X
j2J
dj ) uj = dj8j 2 J:
If ri = ci, then this implies there is at least one child j with dj > 0 and it becomes the problem in
this case again. Continuing in this fashion, there should be at least one node k 2 Ti with rk 6= ck,
which would imply xFk = 1 and, due to constraint (3.27), all the way down to the origin the entire
path from k is selected. Hence if di = ui > 0, then xFi = 1.
Case 2: If di = 0, then ui = di = 0 readily. Moreover, ri   ci  0, otherwise we would have
di > 0. Consequently,
ri   ci < 0) xi = 0) xj = 08j 2 Ti: (3.34)
Hence, if di = 0, then either xj = 0 for all j 2 Ti and we prune the whole subtree Ti, or any subtree
of Ti that is selected should have r = c, throughout. Hence it is optimal to prune Ti if di = 0.
This indifference does not cause any problem on the leader side. We assume that the follower does
not act “malevolently” and if it would not bring benefit to him (i.e., multiple optima), leaves the
decision to the leader.
Now, we start from the root node. By constraint (3.25), doF = uoF is readily given. If doF > 0,
we have an example of Case 1, and uj = dj for all j that are the children of oF . After this, for any
node i, either di = 0 and Case 2 applies, or di > 0 and Case 1 applies. If doF = 0, we have Case 2
and it is optimal for the follower not to move.
Note that this implies ui = di for all selected nodes i, and eventually, uj = dj = rj   cj for j
denoting the leaves (nodes without children) of the selected subtree. Therefore, it is not feasible to
falsely set some di > maxfdi + ri   ci; 0g that would be transferred to the origin.
To sum up, the feasible solution to this set of constraints and the declared domains for variables
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has correctly calculated potential profits d (if they are carried to the origin), which brings correct
actual profits u and any nonprofitable subtree is pruned. This is equivalent to strong pruning in
effect.
This approach brings O(m) additional constraints and variables to the leader’s PCST problem,
where m is the number of nodes in T . This is not many, considering the original number of con-
straints the problem has. This model can easily be extended to a case where the follower evaluates
multiple trees and responds optimally picking a subtree in one of them. Letting T be the set of
those trees, follower variables are going to have an additional index t 2 T . Then the response can
be restricted to the best of these trees by simply setting
P
t2T x
F
o;t = 1. Similarly, multiple origins
can be included into the model using the dummy arcs trick as in Section 3.4.2.
3.6 Computational Study
We tested our models using 80 randomly generated data sets. The data sets can be divided in three
classes. Classes D, R and A stand for “Delaunay”, “random” and “additional”, respectively. Each
class is further divided into subsets consisting 5 instances that have the same properties. Class D
consists of 25 instances. They are Euclidean graphswhich have 100 to 500 nodes that are uniformly
distributed on a 100-by-100 square, and edges that are formed usingDelaunay triangulation. Leader
and follower origins — one for each — are picked randomly. The number of nodes with positive
revenue is set to 25% of all nodes. They are randomly picked excluding origins and their values
are generated uniformly in [; 3] where  is the average edge cost (i.e., length). Class R are again
Euclidean graphs, but no triangulation is used in their generation. They consist of 25 instances.
Nodes are generated in the same manner as class D, but the edges are generated randomly keeping
the edge-to-vertex ratio constant at 3. These graphs are also connected. We first generate a random
spanning tree and then pick the remaining edges. Finally, class A consists of 30 additional instances
that we use for comparison. We generated them over the 200-node instances in class R in order to
test the two constants we used in the data generation. In the first 15 of the additional instances, we
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Table 3.1: Instance settings
Class Subset Nodes Revenue nodes Edges
Edge/node Revenue node
ratio percentage
D
1 100 25 284 2.8 25
2 200 50 582 2.9 25
3 300 75 883 2.9 25
4 400 100 1182 3.0 25
5 500 125 1480 3.0 25
R
1 100 25 300 3 25
2 200 50 600 3 25
3 300 75 900 3 25
4 400 100 1200 3 25
5 500 125 1500 3 25
A
1 200 50 800 4 25
2 200 50 1000 5 25
3 200 50 1200 6 25
4 200 60 600 3 30
5 200 70 600 3 35
6 200 80 600 3 40
varied the edge-to-node ratio in [3; 5] and added additional randomly picked edges. In the second 15,
we changed the percentage of revenue nodes in [25; 40] by generating revenue data for nodes with 0
revenue in the original setting. Properties of these data sets (averaged over subsets) are summarized
in Table 3.1.
3.6.1 Solution Statistics
We coded the model using GAMS and solved the instances using CPLEX 11.1 on a Intel T7500
2.2 GHz 2GB 32-bit computer. Model size and solution statistics of each subset (averaged over 5
instances) of classes D and R are tabulated in Tables 3.2 and 3.3.
We first solve the two-player model (Model 7). We use two trees as the follower’s response
basis. The first one is generated by finding the minimum cost spanning tree for the follower and
then pruning unprofitable subtrees using strong pruning. The second one is generated by finding the
PCST for the follower, hence solving Model 2 for the follower. The values that are reported under
“Stackelberg” correspond to the average of these. After solving the Stackelberg model, we fix the
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leader’s variables at their suggested levels, and solve PCST for the follower in order to compute the
error generated by the restriction of the follower’s response. In order to compare the leader’s loss
from competition, we solve the leader’s single-player problem (Model 2), too. Since the leader and
follower problems are identical with only a few parameter changes, we report them together. “PCST
(L & F)” correspond to the average of these two runs. Then, we solve the equilibrium finding model
(Model 4) and report the results under “Simultaneous”. Finally, we solve the central model and
reported under “central”.
The sizes of the two classes are similar to each other. However, if we look at the solution
statistics in Table 3.3, we see that the instances we obtained through triangulation take longer to
solve than the random instances. An interesting result is that the instances were almost always
solved at the root node, without any LP gap. The solution time with respect to instance type for each
problem type is plotted in Figure 3.7. As expected, solution time increases rapidly with increasing
problem size. The simultaneous-move game model is the most time consuming one, whereas the
rest are similar to each other. Among all instances two (both Stackelberg) were solved in longer
than 1 hour. The twist in Figure 3.7d is caused due to the removal of those instances while plotting
the figure.
The same process is followed for the A instances. These instances were generated from R2 by
adding arcs or adding revenue nodes. The solution statistics for class A is provided in Table 3.4 and
solution times of each type and for each control parameter is illustrated in Figure 3.8. The change in
the number of arcs (hence the edge-to-node ratio) affects the solution time more than the percentage
(hence number) of revenue nodes.
Finally, we compare the profits obtained in the equilibrium and central designs. According
to Figure 3.9a, the loss is less (percentage is high) for the triangulation graph. It increases with
increasing number of arcs, but stays stable for increased number of nodes. Figure 3.9b illustrates
leader’s error obtained by calculating jExpected SuggestedjSuggested , where “suggested” is the leader’s profit
as a result of solving the Stackelberg model and “expected” is the leader’s profit after follower
responds optimally. This error is significantly less for the random instances. The two lines represent
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Figure 3.8: Sensitivity analysis
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Figure 3.9: Sensitivity analysis
two different trees, T , for follower response. Using the PCST of the follower improves the result
significantly.
3.7 Conclusions
We discussed network formation and design under competition. We introduced a network formation
game, characterized optimal strategies for individual players and proposed an iterative method and
a mathematical programming formulation that finds a pure strategy equilibrium solution in order to
anticipate the resulting network. The equilibrium is not unique and the resulting equilibrium solu-
tion, however, is not an extreme equilibrium—the least or most profitable. Therefore, the problem
of measuring the best/worst case deviation from a centralized solution remains open.
Next, we introduced a leader-follower version of the model. This problem is inherently a more
difficult problem as discussed in Chapter 1. In order to obtain near optimal results within short
solution times, we proposed a reformulation approach. We restricted the follower’s response space
to a tree (or set of trees) and demonstrated that strong pruning solves the follower’s problem given
this restriction. Then we expressed the follower’s restricted optimization problem as a feasibility
problem by converting the strong pruning algorithm to a group of linear constraints. The heuristic
reformulation has a single-level problem and is more tractable and can be solved by standard MIP
methods.
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We considered the same game for both players, however this reformulation, and in general
similar reformulation strategies to describe the follower problem, can be implemented in various
scenarios. We are currently developing an implementation for network interdiction using the ideas
presented in this study. In the future we would like to develop an exact optimization method that
employs this solution technique iteratively in an algorithm.
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Chapter 4
A Portfolio Choice Problem:
Simultaneous Signaling
4.1 Introduction
The college application and search process and the job application and search process involve not
only a candidate’s choice of the set of schools or institutions to apply to, but also the set of schools
or institutions to signal interest to. For example, in the job market for economics Ph.D.s organized
by the American Economic Association, a job market candidate not only chooses the set of schools
to which he or she applies, but also the set of (two) schools to which he or she can send, through
the Association, signals of interest. Similarly, in the college admissions process, applicants have the
option to send costly signals to schools, again to increase the probabilities of admission. Examples
of such signals are attending campus tours and information sessions, making phone calls and send-
ing e-mail inquiries, all of which require time and effort from the applicants. Some schools track
this information to evaluate the candidates’ interest in the school.
The Chronicle of Higher Education, 2010, asks the following questions, while investigating
American University’s admission figures: “Howmany applicants would turn down a super-selective,
big-name college to attend a somewhat less-selective, less-famous one? How do you know whether
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a student considers your college a top choice or a ‘safety school’? How does an applicant’s sense
of ‘fit’ with a college relate not only to matriculation, but also retention?” The article continues,
“In recent years, such questions have prompted American’s admissions teams to look more closely
at ‘demonstrated interest,’ the popular term for the contact students make with a college during the
application process, such as by visiting the campus, participating in an interview, or e-mailing an
admissions representative.” (Hoover, 2010)
In the market for Ph.D. economists, Coles et al. (2010a), with data from the American Economic
Association, examine the effectiveness of the AEA signaling mechanism; and in the college admis-
sions process, Dearden et al. (2011), in their empirical section, with data from a highly-selective
medium-sized university, examine the effectiveness of “demonstrated interest.” In theoretical anal-
yses of market signaling, Avery and Levin (2010), Coles et al. (2010b), Dearden et al. (2011), and
Kushnir (2010) examine signaling and institutional offer game-theoretic models. While these mod-
els offer insights into signaling decisions, they are restrictive in that each applicant is permitted to
send only one signal. Given the established empirical importance of signaling, an interesting issue
is the characterization of optimal signaling decisions by a decision maker in a model in which the
choice of the number of signals and which schools to signal is endogenous.
In this chapter, we consider a setting in which a decision maker – either a student applying to
colleges and universities or a graduate applying for jobs – has submitted applications to various
institutions. After submitting the applications, the decision maker has the option to send a costly
signal to each institution. We analyze an individual’s simultaneous choice about the set of institu-
tions to signal. In doing so, we generalize the results of Chade and Smith (2006). Chade and Smith
analyze the problem of characterizing the set of institutions to which a decision maker optimally
applies, assuming that not applying to an institution results in zero probability of an offer from that
institution. Their model, however, could be used to describe the signaling choice problem. But, in
the context of signaling, assuming a zero probability of receiving an offer following no signal is
unrealistic. To consider the signaling decision problem, we generalize their model by permitting the
probability of receiving an offer to be positive (or possibly zero) following no signal.
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We demonstrate that the optimal algorithm to solve the decision maker’s problem identified by
Chade and Smith for their specific environment also is optimal in this more general environment.
Incidentally, they generalize Stigler (1961). Moreover, we pose the same problem as a longest path
problem and propose a dynamic programming algorithm.
The optimal decision rule is a “greedy algorithm”, which Chade and Smith appropriately term
for an economics audience a “marginal improvement algorithm.” This algorithm has the advantage
of being simple; that is, it is easy to characterize and to understand. Furthermore, for the N school
case, the algorithm executes in polynomial time, amounting to O(N3) operations. Therefore, the
solution to a student’s decision about the set of schools to “demonstrate interest” or the new eco-
nomics Ph.D.’s decision about the schools to signal through the AEA mechanism is simple and easy
to characterize.
The key to their proof of the optimality of the marginal improvement algorithm is the “down-
ward recursive” nature of the decision maker’s gross payoff function. (In their model, as in ours, the
decision maker’s utility equals gross payoff less cost.) In our more general environment, however,
the decision maker’s gross payoff function is no longer downward recursive. But, as we demon-
strate, a monotonic transformation of the gross payoff function does satisfy this property. We use
the downward recursive nature of this monotonic transformation in the proof of the optimality of
the marginal improvement algorithm.
Our sequence of lemmas and theorem for the greedy algorithm follows a similar path to that of
Chade and Smith. However, we provide a simpler proof for the optimality of the greedy algorithm.
The dynamic programming algorithm we propose relies on the observation that the problem may be
posed as a nonconventional longest path problem. It offers a better time complexity (O(N2)) using
the same memory (O(N)).
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4.2 The Model
4.2.1 The Signaling Problem
A student has applied to a finite set N = f1; 2; :::; Ng of schools. We avoid using set notation by
writing, for example, i = fig, A+B = A[B, A B = AnB, A^B = A\B, and (i; j) = fk 2
N j i < k < jg. We abuse notation by letting N represent both a natural number and a set N . The
cardinality of the set of subsets ofN is 2N . The student’s decision problem in this model is to choose
a subset of schools to which he or she signals. Let f : 2N 7 ! R+ be a supermodular function.
Interpret f(S) as the expected gross payoff to the student of signaling a subset S of the schools. We
let SA denote the probability of being rejected by each of the schools in A;A  N , given that the
student signals each of the schools in S; S  N . We let A  ;A denote the probability of being
rejected by each of the schools in A, given the student has signaled none of the schools in A. We
assume for each school i 2 N; i  ii. Furthermore, SA = (
Q
i2A^S 
i
i)(
Q
i2A S i). We label
the schools by the student’s ex post utility, u1 > u2 > ::: > uN . The student’s gross payoff of
signaling the schools in S is:
f(S) =
NX
k=1
S[1;k)(1  Sk )uk:
We assume that the cost of signaling a portfolio of schools, S, is a function of the cardinality of
S, c(jSj), where jSj denotes the cardinality of S. We assume that c is increasing and convex and
that c(;) = 0.
We examine the choice of S to maximize the student’s net payoff, v(S) = f(S)   c(jSj). We
assume that f(i)  c(1) > f(;) for at least one i. Let (N) solve
max
SN
v(S); (4.1)
and denote   (N).
In our analysis, we also make use of a special case in which the student signals exactly n schools
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from the set of alternatives N . For this special case, the cost function is c(jSj) = 0 for jSj  n
and c(jSj) = 1 for jSj > n. For this case, we let n(N) denote the solution to (4.1). Further, we
define n  n(N).
From f , we define the function, g : sN 7 ! R+, which equals the decision makers’s net
expected payoff of signaling of signaling S less his or her or expected payoff of signaling the null
set, ;. That is, g(S)  f(S)   f(;). In our proof of the solution to (4.1), which involves the
maximization of f(S)  c(jSj), we analyze the function g.
4.2.2 Properties of the Payoff Functions, f and g
We define that U is above L, written U w L, if the worst prize in U is better than the best prize in
L. The function g is downward recursive (DR) as explained in the following property.
Property 16. Given sets of signaled options U and L in N that satisfy U w L, we have that g is
DR:
g(U + L) = g(U) +
UU
U
g(L): (4.2)
Proof. We begin with:
g(U + L) = f(U + L)  f(;) =
NX
t=1
U+L[1;t) (1  U+Lt )ut   f(;): (4.3)
We partition f1; :::; Ng into two sets f1; :::; l1   1g and fl1; :::; Ng, where l1 is the best alternative
in L, and rewrite (4.3) to obtain:
=
l1 1X
t=1
U[1;t)(1  Ut )ut +
NX
t=l1
U+L[1;t) (1  U+Lt )ut   f(;): (4.4)
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We add and subtract the same expression from (4.4) to obtain:
=
l1 1X
t=1
U[1;t)(1  Ut )ut +
NX
t=l1
U+L[1;t) (1  U+Lt )ut   f(;):
+
NX
t=l1
U[1;t)(1  t)ut  
NX
t=l1
U[1;t)(1  t)ut: (4.5)
We rearrange the terms in (4.5) and use these equalities: first, U+Lt = 
L
t for any t 2 [l1; N ];
second, t = Ut for any t 2 [l1; N ]; third, UUL[1;t) = UU+L[1;t) ; and fourth UU[1;t) = UU[1;t). In
doing so, we obtain:
=
NX
t=1
U[1;t)(1  Ut )ut   f(;)
+
UU
U
 NX
t=l1
L[1;t)(1  Lt )ut  
NX
t=l1
[1;t)(1  t)ut

: (4.6)
We use the fact that the first l1   1 terms of f(L) and f(;) are the same and thus cancel each other
in g(L) = f(L)  f(;) to find:
= g(U) +
UU
U
g(L): (4.7)
which shows that Property (4.2) holds.
We also have that g satisfies the following multiplicative property. For any U w M w L, we
have:
g(U +M + L) = g(U +M) +
U+MU+M
U+M
g(L)
=

g(U) +
UU
U
g(M)

+
U+MU+M
U+M
g(L):
Because
SS
S
 1 and is multiplicative, this function is decreasing in S.
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Even though the function g is a monotonic transformation of f , and g is DR, the function f
is not DR. We demonstrate by means of a counterexample that the function f is not DR. In this
counterexample, consider N = 2. To demonstrate that f is not DR, set f(1 + 2) = f(1) + f(2)
and solve for . In doing so, we have
 =
11(2   22)u2
(1  1)u1 + 1(1  22)u2
;
which indicates that f is not DR.
4.3 The Solution
4.3.1 Properties of the Optimal Set
Chade and Smith establish a key property of DR functions – downward maximization. We establish
that this property extends to f , which is not DR in our environment. However, we do use the
monotonic relationship between f and g, which is DR, in our proof of Lemma 17.
Lemma 17. Let n = U + L, where U w L and L has k elements. Then k(D) = L, where D
are those options in N that are not better ranked than the best in L.
Proof. By contradiction. Assume k(D) 6= L. That is, there exists an S  D such that jSj = k
and f(S) > f(L). By definition of the set U , U w D, which implies U w S. Property 4.2 states
that g(U + S) = g(U) +
UU
U
g(S). Then,
f(S) > f(L), g(S) > g(L), 
U
U
U
g(S) >
UU
U
g(L):
Therefore,
g(U + S) = g(U) +
UU
U
g(S) > g(U) +
UU
U
g(L) = g(U + L):
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However, n = U +L implies f(U +L)  f(U + S) and thus g(U +L)  g(U + S), which is a
contradiction. Therefore k(D) = L.
We move on to Lemma 18, where we consider any two alternatives i and j for which the ex
post preferences, ui > uj (i.e., i < j), matches the ex ante preferences, f(i) > f(j). For these
pairs of alternatives, Lemma 18 states that the marginal values of adding these alternatives to a set
S  N fi; jg has the same ranking,MBi(S) = f(S+i) f(S) > f(S+j) f(S) = MBj(S).
Lemma 18. Assume f(i) > f(j) and i < j. Then the marginal benefits of i and j are ordered
MBi(S) = f(S + i)  f(S) > f(S + j)  f(S) = MBj(S) for any set S  N   fi; jg.
We demonstrate by means of an example that we cannot apply the Chade and Smith proof of
their Lemma 2 to establish our Lemma 18. In this example, consider N = 3 in which f(1) > f(3).
For 1 = 2 = 3 = 1, Chade and Smith in the context of this example demonstrate in their Lemma
2 that f(1 + 2) > f(2 + 3). To do so, they write the expected utility of signaling schools 1 and 2,
and then choosing school 2 if accepted at 2, school 1 if accepted at 1 and rejected by 2, and finally
school 3 if accepted by 3 and rejected by 1 and 2. They demonstrate that for the case in which
1 = 2 = 3 = 1, this suboptimal policy yields an expected utility that is less than f(1 + 2) but
greater than f(2 + 3). Specifically, we express the latter inequality in the context of this example
for the case in which 1 = 2 = 3 = 1:
(1  [1;2]2 )(f(2) + [1;2]2 ((1  [1;2]1 )u1 + s1f(3)))
> (1  [2;3]2 )(f(2) + [2;3]2 ((1  [2;3]3 )u3 + [2;3]3 f(3))):
(4.8)
Therefore, (4.8) does not hold for the case in which (1; 2; 3) 6= (1; 1; 1).
In continuing with the example, let u1 = 2:4, u2 = 2, and u3 = 1:9. Also let 1 = 0:9,
2 = 0:8, 3 = 0:7, s1 = 0:0:8, 
s
2 = 0:7, 
s
3 = 0:6. For this numerical example, we have
f(1) = 1:1648 > f(3) = 1:1472. In an attempt to use (4.8) to establish that if f(1) > f(3), then
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f(1 + 2) > f(2 + 3), we have on the left-hand side of (4.8):
(1  [1;2]2 )u2 + [1;2]2 ((1  [1;2]1 )u1 + [1;2]1 (1  3)u3) = 1:2552:
We have on the right-hand side of (4.8):
(1  1)u1 + 1((1  [2;3]2 )u2 + [2;3]2 (1  [2;3]3 )u3) = 1:2588:
Hence, for this example (4.8) does not hold. Based on this example, we therefore develop a new
proof of Lemma 18.
Proof. We start with f(i)  f(j) and gradually build f(S + i)  f(S + j). In our notation, we let
uN+1 = 0, which is a dummy option that we include to preserve the integrity of our expression. We
express f(i), the expected utility from signaling school i, as:
f(i) =
i 1X
t=1
[1;t) (1  t)ut + [1;i) (1  ii)ui +
NX
t=i+1
[1;t) i ii(1  t)ut
= (1  1)u1 + :::+ [1;i)(1  ii)ui + :::+ i[1;N 1](1  N )uN
= u1   1(u1   u2)  :::  [1;i) ii(ui   ui+1)  :::  [1;N ] i ii(uN   uN+1):
We now construct f(i)   f(j). In expressing this difference, we can derive from the above
expression that the first minfi; jg   1 terms of f(i) and f(j) are identical. As i < j, the first i  1
terms of f(i)  f(j) cancel. Note that in this proof, we partition the signaling set S into U ,M , and
L, where U  [1; i),M  (i; j), and L  (j;N ]. We have that f(i)  f(j) is expressed as follows:
f(i)  f(j)
= [1;i)
0@j 1X
t=i
(i;t](i   ii)(ut   ut+1) +
NX
t=j
(i;t] j (i
j
j   iij)(ut   ut+1)
1A > 0: (4.9)
Note that i   ii  0 and ut   ut+1 > 0. Therefore, all terms of the summation on the
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left (that is, for t = fi; : : : ; j   1g) are positive. Also note that ijj   iij can be positive or
negative. Therefore, all terms of the summation on the right (that is, t = fj; :::; Ng) will either be
positive or negative. Our assumption that f(i)   f(j) > 0 implies that the cumulative sum up to
n 2 fi; : : : ; Ng is always positive, because the negative terms in (4.9) occur only starting with term
t = j.
We use the following property in the next step of the proof.
Property 19. Let x; y 2 R such that x > 0 and x+ y > 0, and let r 2 [0; 1]. Then we have
x+ ry > 0; (4.10)
because if y > 0 then x+ ry > r(x+ y)  0, and if y  0 then x+ ry  x+ y > 0.
Next, for some n 2 fi; :::; Ng let x be the cumulative sum up to t = n   1, y be the sum over
the remaining terms, and r be 
n
n
n
2 [0; 1]. For x > 0, x+ y > 0 and r 2 [0; 1], we can apply (4.10)
in Property 19 to the following. We multiply each term in (4.9) for t > n and t 2 S by r = nnn
iteratively until all n are accounted for:
[1;i)
 
j 1X
t=i
M(i;t](i   ii)(ut   ut+1) +
NX
t=j
M+L(i;t] (i
j
j   iij)(ut   ut+1)
1A > 0:
We rearrange the left-hand-side by splitting the factors (i   ii) and (ijj   iij), and also by
taking the outer factors, [1;i), inside. In doing so, we obtain:
NX
t=i
M+L[1;t] 
j
j(ut   ut+1) 
NX
t=i
M+L[1;t] 
i
i(ut   ut+1) > 0: (4.11)
Finally, we multiply it by
UU
U
2 [0; 1], then add and subtract u1  
Pt=i 1
t=1 
U
[1;t](ut   ut+1). (Note
that this term is 0 if U = ;.) In doing so, we see that the left-hand-side of (4.11) is equal to
f(S + i)  f(S + j). Therefore f(S + i)  f(S + j) > 0.
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Our next lemma yields a simple insight about .
Lemma 20. Assume f(i) > f(j) and i < j. If j 2 n(N), then i 2 n(N).
We provide a simple proof of this property.
Proof. By contradiction. Assume j 2 n(N), but i 62 n(N). Let S  n(N)   fjg. Then by
Lemma 18, f(S+i) > f(S+j). This implies f(S+i) > f(n(N))which leads to a contradiction
as n(N) is the optimal solution.
4.3.2 The Optimal Algorithm
We move on to establishing that the following greedy algorithm, by an inductive procedure, identi-
fies .
Algorithm 4.1MIA: Marginal Improvement Algorithm
let Y0 = ; and n = 0
repeat
set n = n+ 1
choose any in 2 argmaxi2N f(Yn 1 + i)
set Yn = Yn 1 + in
until f(Yn)  f(Yn 1) < c(n) + c(n  1)
return optimal set Yn 1
The MIA works as follows. The decision maker begins by calculating f(1) through f(n),
and includes the option, i, with the greatest value in S. The decision maker then recalculates,
determining f(i + j) for each j 2 N   i. He or she adds the option j that brings the greatest
f(i + j). The decision maker continues until he or she hits the point where for each k 62 S,
f(S + k)  f(S) < c(jS + 1j)  c(jSj). Our primary result is:
Theorem 21. The MIA implements the optimal set  for problem (4.1) with D = N .
We provide a simpler proof than Chade and Smith (2006) based on the following observation.
Consider the optimal set with n signaled options, n(N), and let S  n(N). If we set i = Si
for all i 2 S and solve for the best n   jSj options in N with updated probabilities, we obtain
98
4.3. THE SOLUTION
n jSj(N) = n(N)   S. We can see that this is true because we simply fix the already known
jSj options in the optimal set (because signaling i when i = ii is clearly suboptimal) and solve for
the remaining n  jSj best options.
Proof. Assume we are given n(N). Let j be the lowest ranked (i.e., largest indexed) option in
n+1(N) n(N). Note that such a j must exist because then+1(N) has one more option even if
the rest of the options are common. Let S be the subset of options inn+1(N) that are lower ranked
than j. Note that S is common to both optimal sets by definition of j, hence S  n+1(N)\n(N).
Let fi1; : : : ; in jSjg be the options in n(N) that are better ranked than j. We will iteratively show
that j’s being in the optimal set implies that each it is in the optimal set for t 2 f1; : : : ; n  jSjg.
Let us start with t = 1. First, we update the rejection probabilities k = Sk for all k 2 S.
Then, by Lemma 17, we have 1([1; i1]) = i1. This implies f(i1) > f(j). Then, since i1 < j and
j 2 n+1 jSj([1; i1]), we have i1 2 n+1 jSj([1; i1]) by Lemma 20.
For the remaining t, we update rejection probabilities it 1 = 
it 1
it 1 . We obtain 1([1; it]) = it
by applying Lemma 17. This implies f(it) > f(j). Then, since it < j and j 2 n+1 jSj (t 1)([1; it]),
we have it 2 n+1 jSj (t 1)([1; it]) by Lemma 20. Then, we increment t.
When t = n   jSj, we obtain in jSj 2 2([1; in jSj]). As j is also in the optimal set, this
implies 2([1; in jSj]) = fj; in jSjg, which in turn, implies n+1(N) = n(N) + fjg.
Since 1(N) = argmaxk2N f(k), Algorithm 4.1 returns Yn(N) = n(N) for each n. To
complete the proof, the stopping rule in Algorithm 4.1 is optimal because c(n) in convex in n and
f by Lemma 22 (below) has diminishing returns — f(A + k)   f(A) is decreasing in A for any
k 62 A  N . Furthermore, because c is a function of only the cardinality of N ,  = n(N)
For the function f , the marginal benefit of adding j to choice set S is decreasing in S. Specifi-
cally, for S  S0, we have:
f(S + j)  f(S) = S[1;j)
0@ NX
t=j
S(j;t](j   jj)(ut   ut+1)
1A
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 S0[1;j)
0@ NX
t=j
S
0
(j;t](j   jj)(ut   ut+1)
1A
= f(S0 + j)  f(S0)
We therefore have:
Lemma 22. The function f : 2N 7! R+ has diminishing returns.
4.4 Comparative Statics
We analyze whether students tend to signal schools that are more selective. Specifically, if a school
becomes more selective, will a student move from not signaling the school to signaling the school?
Similarly, if a school becomes less selective, will a student move from signaling the school to not
signaling the school? In answering these questions, which we do in Theorem 23, we change only
the probabilities of admission, conditional on signaling and not signaling the school. Note that we
do not change the student’s utility of the school. Furthermore, to change school i’s selectivity, we
change the admissions probabilities of school i, Si and 
S+i
i , so that 
S
i   S+ii does not change.
As we demonstrate in the proof to Theorem 23, changing Si and 
S+i
i , without changing 
S
i  
S+ii , leaves the student’s marginal benefit of signaling school i unchanged. However, the marginal
benefit of signaling each other school does change. Therefore, while the changes in Si and 
S+i
i
may affect, Theorem 23 answers the question about whether these changes in probabilities affect
the decision to signal school i.
To examine the effect of the change in a school’s selectivity, we introduce additional notation.
Let f denote the expected utility and  denote the optimal set under the probability structure
 = (1; :::; N ; 
1
1; :::; 
N
N ). In Theorem 23, we compare the optimal choice sets under two different
probability structures:  = (1; :::; N ; 11; :::; 
N
N ) and % = (1; :::; %i; :::; N ; 
1
1; :::; %
i
i; :::; 
N
N ) for
which %i > i, %ii > 
i
i, and %i   %ii = i   ii.
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Theorem 23. Consider  = (1; :::; N ; 11; :::; NN ) and % = (1; :::; %i; :::; N ; 
1
1; :::; %
i
i; :::; 
N
N )
for which %i > i, %ii > 
i
i, and %i   %ii = i   ii.
(i) If i 62 ; then i 62 %:
(ii) If i 2 %; then i 2 :
Proof. Statement (ii) is the contrapositive of statement (i), hence has the same truth value as (i).
Therefore, we only prove (i). In our proof, we begin by establishing four properties about the
relationship between f and f%. With these properties in place, we prove the claim in (i), namely if
i 62 , then i 62 %.
For some i 2 N , let %i   i = %Si   Si = , and note that  > 0. We now establish the first of
four relationships of f and f%.
Claim 1: If f(S + j) > f(S + i) for some j < i and S  N   fi; jg, then f%(S + j) >
f%(S + i).
We prove this claim using (4.9):
f%(S + j)  f%(S + i)
= S[1;j)
0@ i 1X
t=j
S(j;t](j   jj)(ut   ut+1) +
NX
t=i
S(j;t] i (j%
i
i   jj%i)(ut   ut+1)
1A
= S[1;j)
0@ i 1X
t=j
S(j;t](j   jj)(ut   ut+1) +
NX
t=i
S(j;t] i (j(
i
i + )  jj(i + ))(ut   ut+1)
1A
= f(S + j)  f(S + i) + S[1;j)
 
NX
t=i
S(j;t] i (j   jj)(ut   ut+1)
!
> f(S + j)  f(S + i) > 0: (4.12)
This completes the proof of Claim 1.
Next, we move on to our second relationship between f and f%. For this relationship, we
consider three schools i; j and k, for which j > i and also k 6= j. (Recall %i > i, %Si > Si , and
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%i   Si = %i   Si .)
Claim 2: If f(S + j) > f(S + k) for some j > i and S  N   fj; kg, then f%(S + j) >
f%(S + k).
To prove Claim 2, we first consider k < j. Note that the calculations below depend on whether
i is greater than, less than, or equal to k. Referring again to (4.9), we have:
f(S + j)  f(S + k)
= S[1;k)
0@j 1X
t=k
S(k;t](
k
k   k)(ut   ut+1) +
NX
t=j
S(k;t] j (
k
kj   kjj)(ut   ut+1)
1A :
If k > i, then only the factor S[1;k) in this expression changes and we obtain:
f%(S + j)  f%(S + k) = (1 + )(f(S + j)  f(S + k)) > 0:
If k = i, only the last term in the parentheses changes (note that %i   %Si = i   Si ), and we obtain
f%(S + j)  f%(S + k) = f(S + j)  f(S + k)
+ S[1;k)
0@ NX
t=j
S(k;t] j (j   jj)(ut   ut+1)
1A > 0:
Finally, if k < i, both terms in the parentheses change. Note that the term in parentheses below is
greater than 0, and we obtain:
f%(S + j)  f%(S + k) = f(S + j)  f(S + k)
+ S[1;i) k
0@j 1X
t=i
S(i;t](
k
k   k)(ut   ut+1) +
NX
t=j
S(i;t] j (
k
kj   kjj)(ut   ut+1)
1A > 0:
For the case in which k > j, a change in i or si does not affect the sign of f(S+j) f(S+k).
Therefore, Claim 2 holds for k > j. This completes the proof of Claim 2.
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Claim 3: Consider a set S; S  . If f(S + j) > f(S + k) for all k 2 N   S, then j 2 .
To prove Claim 3, observe that we can solve for the optimal choice set by the following two-step
process. First, create a new probability structure ^ by setting sk equal to k for each k 2 S, where
S is a set in . Second, for this new probability structure ^, solve for ^(N   jSj). Because we
proved that MIA finds the optimal choice given any 0  k  sk  1, the MIA can be used to find
^(N   jSj). Then, finding the j such that f(S + j) > f(S + k) for all k is the next step of MIA
applied to the probability structure ^, which completes the proof of Claim 3.
Claim 4: The marginal benefit of adding i to choice set S is the same under both probability
structures,  and %.
To prove Claim 4, we have:
f%(S + i)  f%(S) = S[1;i)
 
NX
t=i
S(i;t](i +    ii   )(ut   ut+1)
!
= f(S + i)  f(S)
We are finished with the four claims.
We now proceed to prove (i) by contradiction. Assume i 62  and i 2 %. Consider the MIA.
We start with ;, and step-by-step build our optimal set % under the probability structure %. In the
optimal set, , let jm 2 argmaxj2N f(m 1+ j) denote the school added at stage j of the MIA
under the probability structure .
We begin with step 1. If j1 < i, by Claim 1 and Lemma 20, j1 2 %. If j1 > i, then by Claim
2, j1 2 %. We now have that j1 2 %.
We continue building the optimal set % and arrive at stepm, 1 < m < n, where we attempt to
add i to%. However, jm 2 % by the same proof as in step 1 and Claim 3 and jm 6= i. Therefore,
we cannot add i before n+ 1st iteration.
If we add i at an iteration r > n, then by Claim 4 we obtain:
f%( + fjn+1; : : : ; jr 1g+ i)  f%( + fjn+1; : : : ; jr 1g)
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= f( + fjn+1; : : : ; jr 1g+ i)  f( + fjn+1; : : : ; jr 1g): (4.13)
By diminishing returns (i.e. Lemma 22), we obtain:
f( + fjn+1; : : : ; jr 1g+ i)  f( + fjn+1; : : : ; jr 1g)  f( + i)  f(): (4.14)
Finally, by the optimality of  under initial probability structure , we obtain:
f( + i)  f()  c(n+ 1)  c(n): (4.15)
Putting together (4.13), (4.14), and (4.15), we have that i is not added to % by the MIA in any
iteration r > n.
We now have that i is not included in any iteration of the step-by-step building of % by the
MIA. Hence, we have a contradiction.
4.5 Alternative Formulation
4.5.1 Longest Path Problem
The problem that the student faces can be restated from a different point of view, as a longest path
problem. We use Figure 4.1 to represent the decision problem. In this figure, the student starts the
evaluation from the grey node (i.e., a dummy node N + 1 with uN+1 = 0; N+1 = N+1N+1 = 1).
We describe horizontal points in the figure — N + 1; N;N   1; :::; 1 — as schools and vertical
points — n = 0; 1; 2; :::; N — as the number of options that the student, at a stage, has chosen to
signal. At every stage the student has the option to signal the next alternative (represented by a solid
arrow) or not (represented by a dashed arrow). We use the following notation to refer to nodes on
this network. Let (i; n) be the node depicting horizontal point i and vertical point n, i.e., school i
and n signals. That is, at node (i; n), the student has previously chosen to signal n of the schools
and must decide whether to signal school i+ 1.
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12/6/2011
1
N+1 N …N-1 1
N …N-1 1
…N-1 1
…
…
1Signal
Do not signal
n = 0
n = 1
n = N
n = 2
…
Figure 4.1: Network representation of the signaling problem
In Figure 4.1, any solution S to our original problem, (4.1), can be represented as a directed path
from the original node (N + 1; 0) to a terminal node (1; jSj). We let l(i; S) represent the length of
the path from (N + 1; 0) to (i; jSj). We define l(i; S) as
l(i; S) =
NX
j=i
S(j;N ](1  Sj )uj :
We define the longest distance from node (N + 1; 0) to node (i; n) as d(i; n) = maxS:jSj=n l(i; S).
Next, we characterize our original problem as maximizing d(1; n)   c(n) over n, which is
finding the longest path from node (N +1; 0) to node (1; n) for some n. This longest path problem
is not defined in the traditional way, in which the marginal utility of signaling a school (i; n) is
independent of the path and the objective function is additive. Therefore, we name this problem the
nonadditive longest path problem (NLPA).
The signaling problem in (4.1) has some properties which allow a more efficient approach to
solve it. First, the objective function is downward recursive, hence Lemma 17 indicates that we
can benefit from dynamic programming as the optimal selection among lower ranked options stays
the same and we can benefit from considering options by decreasing values of their indices (i.e.,
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increasing payoffs). Normally, with option specific costs the state space can be large. However, the
cardinality dependent cost structure reduces the state space to f0; : : : ; Ng in general and if there
is a budget of n to f0; : : : ; ng. Similarly, the order of schools indicates an acyclic graph and the
assumption that we are given a selected set of options (i.e., applied schools) reduces our stages
to f1; : : : ; Ng. The signaling problem, so NLPA, can be solved by the dynamic programming
algorithm described below in Algorithm 4.2, which has a better time complexity than the MIA as
we will demonstrate.
Algorithm 4.2 NLPA: Nonadditive Longest Path Algorithm
let d(N + 1; 0) = 0,
n = 0 fsignal no optionsg
for i = N down to 1 do
d(i; n) = (1  i)ui + id(i+ 1; n)) p(i; n) = (i+ 1; n)
end for
repeat
n = n+ 1
i = N + 1  n fsignal all n options in fi; : : : ; Ngg
d(i; n) = (1  ii)ui + iid(i+ 1; n  1)) p(i; n) = (i+ 1; n  1)
for i = N   n down to 1 do
d(i; n) = max

(1  ii)ui + iid(i+ 1; n  1); ) p(i; n) = (i+ 1; n  1)
(1  i)ui + id(i+ 1; n); ) p(i; n) = (i+ 1; n)
end for
until d(1; n)  d(1; n  1) < c(n) + c(n  1)
return optimal number of options to signal n = n  1, and parents p
Note that the first for loop calculates the “signal no options” case, which does not require
any comparison. Similarly, calculations about nodes (N + 1   n; n) can be performed without
comparison because at most n schools can be signaled among n schools, hence all are signaled.
The second and third assignment statements in the repeat...until loop performs this. The
algorithm yields a longest path tree rooted at (N + 1; 0), hence each node (i; n) will have a parent
node p(i; n) depending on the decision to signal or not to signal option i. Then the optimal solution
Yn can be retrieved by Algorithm 4.3. Algorithms 4.2 and 4.3 returns the optimal solution as the
following theorem states.
Theorem 24. d(i; n) is the maximal distance between nodes (N + 1; 0) and (i; n).
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Algorithm 4.3 NLPA: Retrieve optimal set
let i = 1, Yn = ; and k = n
while k > 0 do
if p(i; k) = (i+ 1; k   1) then
Yn = Yn + i
k = k   1
end if
i = i+ 1
end while
return optimal set Yn
Proof. By induction. It holds trivially for (i; 0) and (i;N + 1   i) as these correspond to “no
option signaled” and “all options signaled” cases, respectively. Assume it holds for (i + 1; n) and
(i+1; n  1), we claim that d(i; n)  l(i; S) for each S v i such that jSj = n. For a contradiction,
assume such an S exists but d(i; n) < l(i; S). If i 2 S, we have Si = ii, hence:
l(i; s) = (1  ii)ui + iil(i+ 1; S   i);
 (1  ii)ui + Si d(i+ 1; n  1)  d(i; n):
Otherwise, if i 62 S, we have S   i = S and Si = i, therefore:
l(i; s) = (1  i)ui + il(i+ 1; S   i);
 (1  i)ui + id(i+ 1; n)  d(i; n):
This is a contradiction as we assumed d(i; n) < l(i; S). Therefore, d(i; n) equals the length of the
longest path to (i; n).
Finally, letting i = 1, we obtain d(i; n) = f(n) for each n. The equivalence between a
solution S to the original problem and a path from (N + 1; 0) to (1; n) implies that NLPA solves
the problem optimally. The following example shows a sample run of the algorithm.
Consider a case with N = 3. Let u = [100; 90; 80],  = [0:4; 0:5; 0:2], N = [0:3; 0:2; 0:1]
and c(n) = n. For n = 0 the calculations are trivial and we obtain d(1; 0) = f(0) = 90:8, when
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12/19/2011
1
4
0
1
2
3
13 2
(a) Longest paths for each n
12/19/2011
1
d(1,2) = 95.44
p(2,1) = (4,0)
d(1,3) = 95.92
d(1,2) = 92.92
d(1,0) = 90.8
(b) Optimal path
Figure 4.2: NLPA example
no options are signaled. For n = 1, d(3; 1) = 72 with p(3; 1) = (4; 0), d(2; 1) = 84:8 with
p(2; 1) = (3; 0) and d(1; 1) = 93:92 with p(1; 1) = (2; 1). Since d(1; 1)  d(1; 0) = 3:12 > 1, we
continue. For n = 2, d(2; 2) = 86:4with p(2; 2) = (3; 1) and d(1; 2) = 95:44with p(1; 2) = (2; 1).
Now, d(1; 2)  d(1; 1) = 1:52 > 1, we continue. Finally, for n = 3, we have d(1; 3) = 95:92 with
p(1; 3) = (2; 2). As d(1; 3) d(1; 2) = 0:48 < 1, we stop, returning n = 2. The resulting solution
graph is illustrated in Figure 4.2.
The optimal set is retrieved as follows. We start from node (1; 2) with Y2 = ;. The parent of
that node is p(1; 2) = (2; 1), hence Y2 = f1g. Now, at node (2; 1), we check p(2; 1) = (3; 0), hence
Y2 = f1; 2g. Then, we stop. The optimal set is f1; 2g.
In Theorem 25, we compare the computational complexities of the two algorithms.
Theorem 25. MIA runs inO(N3) time and requiresO(N) memory. NLPA runs inO(N2) time and
requires O(N) memory.
Proof. MIA runs in O(N) steps. At each step n, it makes O(N) comparisons in order to find
argmaxi2N f(Yn 1 + i). Each of these comparisons requires calculating f . It takes O(N) opera-
tions to calculate f(S) for any S  N . Therefore, MIA runs in O(N3) time.
MIA requires O(N) memory. It requires O(1) memory for calculating f , which can be done
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sequentially starting from the lowest ranked options. And it requires O(N) to store the optimal set.
NLPA, on the other hand, runs in O(N) steps. At each step n, it makes O(N) comparisons, but
each comparison requires O(1) operations. The advantage of NLPA over MIA is that, in each step
n, NLPA calculates f(S) only once, which is for S = n. Retrieving the solution requires O(N)
time. Hence, NLPA runs in O(N2) time.
As for memory, Algorithm 4.2 calculates longest path lengths d and requires parents p to be
stored, hence it requires O(N2) memory. However, we can modify the algorithm to obtain a com-
plexity as stated in the theorem. First, we see that once level n calculations are made, level n   1
becomes obsolete, hence we do not need to store the entire grid of values, but only the current and
the previous. Therefore, the longest path length calculations can be performed using a 2N vector.
Moreover, once an upward arc pointing to i is selected in iteration n, only upward arcs pointing
i are selected in the subsequent steps. This is because once an option is in the optimal set, it stays
in the optimal set; and an upward arc pointing i at iteration n implies i 2 n([1; i]). Therefore,
instead of storing the parents p, we can store the first iteration in which an upward arc pointing to i
is selected. Let v denote this vector and note that vi  N   i+ 1 for all i because there are N   i
options that are lower ranked than i. Then, we can still retrieve the optimal solution in O(N) time
using Algorithm 4.4. Therefore, NLPA can be altered to require O(N) memory.
Algorithm 4.4 NLPA: Retrieve optimal set using v
let i = 1, Yn = ; and k = n
while k > 0 do
if vi  k then
Yn = Yn + i
k = k   1
end if
i = i+ 1
end while
return optimal set Yn
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4.5.2 Reformulation
Now we describe a set of linear constraints that imitates the NLPA algorithm, hence yields the
optimal result for the signaling problem. This idea is similar to the heuristic reformulations of the
follower problems in Chapters 2 and 3. The key difference is that, for the signaling problem, the
applicant’s problem can be solved “optimally”. Although we do not consider the game version of
this problem in this chapter, we present an example of the reformulation of the applicant’s problem
using ordinary linear constraints below. We use the following notation.
Variables:
din : Longest distance from node (N + 1; 0) to node (i; n)
v: Net payoff, that is, longest path length minus signaling cost
xsin : Flow from node (i; n) to option i+ 1 when i is signaled (s = 1) or not (s = 0)
ysin : Given that n options are signaled in [i;N ], if option i is signaled (i.e., arc connecting
(i+ 1; n  1) to (i; n) is on the longest path), y1in = 1, else (i.e., arc connecting (i+ 1; n) to
(i; n) is on the longest path) y0in = 1.
The constraints resemble the idea we used in Chapter 3 for the competitive prize-collecting
Steiner tree problem. We first define the flow variable d that originates from node (N + 1; 0) and
goes to to every node until option 1. Then, we calculate the expected utilities at option 1, for each
n. Finally, we define a flow x from option 1 to N + 1, which yields the optimal decisions y.
The first flow di;n represents the potential longest distance to each node (i; n). It is calculated
using constraint (4.16), similar to Algorithm 4.2. The main difference is that, in constraints we
make the calculation for each (i; n) pair unlike the algorithm, in which we iterate over n until
finding the optimal one. Given that n options are signaled until (including) option i, there could
be two possibilities: i is signaled (first inequality) or not (second inequality). Each node j supplies
either (1 jj)uj or (1 j)uj depending on the decision. Since we do not consider the decision yet,
we name the variable “potential longest distance”. In the optimal solution, the din that correspond
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to the longest path will have the longest distances.
din 
8><>:
iidi+1;n 1 + (1  ii)ui 8i 2 N; n 2 f1; : : : ; N + 1  ig
idi+1;n + (1  i)ui 8i 2 N; n 2 f0; : : : ; N   ig
(4.16)
Once we arrive at option 1, we calculate the d1;n using (4.16), and then calculate the optimal
net payoff v = maxnfv(n)g for each n using constraint (4.17) below.
v  d1;n   cn 8n 2 f0; : : : ; Ng (4.17)
Next, we calculate the reverse flow x. We initiate the flow as in constraint (4.18). Now, the
individual contributions of the options are associated with binary decision variables y. The payoff
from the lower ranked options are transferred once the individual contribution is deducted as in
constraint (4.19).
v +
NX
n=0
cn(y
0
1;n + y
1
1;n) =
NX
n=0

(1  1)u1y01;n + (1  11)u1y11;n + 1x01;n + 11x11;n

8n 2 f0; : : : ; Ng (4.18)
x0i 1;n + x
1
i 1;n+1 = (1  i)uiy0i;n + (1  ii)uiy1i;n + ix0i;n + iix1i;n
8i 2 f2; : : : ; N + 1g; n 2 f0; : : : ; N + 1  ig (4.19)
Note that certain x and y that do not correspond to arcs in Figure 4.1 are equal to 0 by definition.
Furthermore, in order to obtain a tree in the end, we add the following constraints. (4.20) states that
there is an arc entering node (i; n) in the optimal solution if and only if there is an arc leaving
it. (4.21) states that only one arc is selected at first, which combined with (4.20) ensures that the
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resulting structure is a tree.
y0i;n + y
1
i;n = y
0
i 1;n + y
1
i 1;n+1 8i 2 f1; : : : ; N   1g; n 2 f0; : : : ; N + 1  ig (4.20)
1 = y0N;0 + y
1
N;1 (4.21)
Finally, d, x and v are nonnegative and y is binary. It is not difficult to see that these constraints
result in the optimal solution as the following theorem states.
Theorem 26. Constraints (4.16)-(4.21) constitute a sufficient optimality condition for the signaling
problem and return optimal solution y and optimal net payoff v.
Proof. Constraints (4.16)-(4.17) ensure that the calculated longest distances are greater than or
equal to the actual longest distances, hence v is greater than or equal to optimal net payoff. Now,
let us look at constraint (4.19). At node (N + 1; 0), we have x0N;0 + x
1
N;1 = 0. Constraint (4.21)
ensures that only one arc (connecting (N +1; 0) to (N; 0) or (N; 1)) is selected, hence not only the
flow through the unselected arc, but also the flow x into the unvisited node, becomes zero. That is,
y0N;0 = 0) x0N 1;0 + x1N 1;1 = 0
y1N;1 = 0) x0N 1;1 + x1N 1;2 = 0
Consequently, no flow passes through any x that corresponds to an unselected arc. Therefore, since
constraints (4.18)-(4.19) are equalities, and the flow x only includes contributions from selected
arcs, the calculated net payoff v in (4.18) is equal to the net payoff of the selected path. Since v is
already greater than or equal to the net payoff of the maximum net payoff, it is equal to the optimal
(maximum) net payoff and the associated y is the optimal solution to the signaling problem.
We do not further investigate and refine these constraints and spare it for future studies.
112
4.6. CONCLUSIONS
4.6 Conclusions
We demonstrated that a greedy algorithm implements the optimal set for a simultaneous signaling
problem, a problem that applies most directly to signaling college admissions and job search pro-
cesses. In characterizing the optimal algorithm, we extended the analysis of Chade and Smith (2006)
to an environment in which non-inclusion in a choice set results possibly in a non-zero probability
of acceptance — either university admission or a job offer.
Moreover, we showed that the problem can be restated as a longest path problem, for which we
proposed a dynamic programming algorithm, which is more efficient than the initial greedy algo-
rithm we studied. Finally, using a similar idea as in Chapter 3, we derived a set of constraints based
on a flow argument, which constitute a sufficient optimality condition for the signaling problem.
Our study is part of two larger research issues. The first is the determination of the optimal
algorithm for a simultaneous search and signaling problem. As an example of this problem, a high
school senior must decide not only the set of schools to which he or she applies, but also the subset
(of those to which he or she sends applications) of schools to which the applicant sends a signal. Our
preliminary results on this problem indicate that a straightforward greedy algorithm is not optimal.
However, the problem can again be posed as a longest path problem and NLPA could solve it. Again
using the insight from NLPA, we believe that MIA can be modified to solve this problem, too.
The second problem is the determination of the acceptance probabilities (with and without sig-
nals) in a college or job matching problem. Dearden et al. (2011) examine, both theoretically and
empirically, whether signaling has a heterogeneous effect in a population of applicants. In partic-
ular, this model examines the determination of equilibrium acceptance probabilities as a function
of applicant SAT scores. Their analysis demonstrates that the positive effect of a signal on accep-
tance probabilities is increasing in SAT scores. The results of their theoretical model are somewhat
restrictive, however, because the model has only two selective schools and furthermore each appli-
cant can send only one signal. The examination of a general model with N schools and a general
signaling cost function could yield interesting results.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Research
Most classical models for network design and operations research, in general, assume a single de-
cision maker with a single objective. This assumption fails to represent problems adequately when
there are multiple decision makers or a decision maker has multiple goals. In this research, we dealt
with an extension of the former type and incorporated hierarchical competition in three network
design problems. Incorporating competition, however, brings a trade-off between higher represen-
tation power and increased solution effort.
We introduced a heuristic reformulation idea in order to solve these problems near-optimally
within reasonably short solution times. The essence of the idea was to find or derive a simple algo-
rithm for the problem, represent it as a feasibility problem using linear constraints and embed them
into the leader’s problem in order to obtain a single-level MIP. We demonstrated three implementa-
tions on network design problems — maximal covering, Steiner tree and longest path.
We first studied the competitive maximal covering location problem. In this problem, two firms
enter the market —locate their facilities— sequentially, each with the objective of maximizing the
customer demand it captures in the end. The problem that the leader faces is significantly more
difficult to solve, because the leader has to anticipate the best response of the follower, which,
alone, is the solution of an NP-hard optimization problem. We overcame this difficulty by using a
greedy algorithm as a proxy for the follower’s decision. Not only is the computational performance
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very reasonable, but the solution quality is also very high. Even if the follower actually responds
optimally, the method still provides an effective heuristic for the leader’s problem.
Our model assumes that both firms have perfect information about the customer demand. If
the leader is the first entrant to a market that is not yet mature and there is a time gap until the
follower enters, it is reasonable to think that the customer demand can change between the two
actions. We can introduce this demand uncertainty into our model, where the leader does not know
but has a probabilistic belief about what the customer demands will be in the long run. On the other
hand, the follower is assumed to observe the long run demand and enter the somewhat matured
market. This uncertainty results in a Stackelberg game with imperfect and asymmetric information,
where asymmetry favors the follower, who perfectly knows the state of demands. We can model
the situation using a two-stage stochastic programming approach, where under each scenario the
follower responds implementing a greedy response and the leader maximizes expected capture.
Our second study models a competitive distribution system design problem. We model firms
that compete by building their individual distribution networks to serve customers. Each would like
to maximize its network profit, which is the net of revenue at the demand nodes that are served
and investment costs of the arcs that are built. Consequently, the decisions of each firm affect the
revenue structure of the network. This corresponds to a competitive version of the prize-collecting
Steiner tree problem. We consider both simultaneous-move and sequential games. We characterize
an equilibrium solution for the former setting using a MIP model to determine the players’ optimal
solutions. For the sequential game, due to the same computational difficulty as before, we replace
the follower’s optimal response with the strong pruning heuristic. The heuristic relies on finding
the best induced subtree from a population of trees, and subsequent pruning of branches given the
leader’s solution. The result is a tractable model that offers short solution times to produce near-
optimal design strategies.
This method can easily be implemented for other bilevel problems whose second-level problem
can be represented as a prize-collecting Steiner tree problem. An example is highway drug interdic-
tion. In this problem we can consider the follower to be a criminal organization smuggling drugs
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into the country using roadways and the leader as a law enforcement institution who has a limited
number of patrol units to deploy along these roads. Each patrol unit deployed increases the cost of
using that particular road for the trafficker. Now instead of sharing nodal revenue, we model the in-
crease in cost (in discrete steps) as units are deployed. Since we restrict the follower to a collection
of trees, there is no significant distinction between selecting a node or selecting an arc. Therefore,
we believe that the method can be applied to this problem with minimal additional effort.
Finally, in our last study, we investigated demonstrated interest in the job and university appli-
cation process. We revisited the college admissions problem in a sequential game with imperfect
information. In this game, there is a market formed by candidates (e.g., students, job applicants)
and institutions (e.g., schools, companies). Each candidate applies to a set of institutions and sub-
sequently demonstrates further interest in order to increase his or her acceptance probability by
signaling a subset of these. In this dissertation, we study the applicants’ side of this game and have
developed an algorithm that characterizes the candidates’ optimal choices. We also formulate the
problem as a non-additive longest-path problem and introduce a dynamic programming algorithm,
for which we showed an initial formulation using linear constraints. The appeal of this formula-
tion was that, as the algorithm solved the problem optimally, this was an exact reformulation of the
second-level problem.
The next step in this research is to establish the school’s problem and analyze the resulting game.
We would like to derive results on the selectivity of the schools and evaluate admission policies. The
proposed algorithm can be considered in multiple dimensions. If we consider a budget for both the
selection and signaling decisions, we can model the problem using a similar network structure.
Now, there would be three decisions at every node: “do not select”, “select”, “select and signal”.
In conclusion, we believe our study opens new research directions in bilevel programming.
There are several other application areas including traffic management, network interdiction and
electricity demand response management, to name a few. In the near future, we would like to
explore applications and extensions of these ideas and develop specific solution methods for the
resulting models.
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